Reviewing planning theory

Neuere englischsprachige Beiträge zur planungstheoretischen Diskussion

Hanno Ehrbeck, Klaus Selle (Hrsg.)
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Impressum

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Vorwort


Wir hoffen, diese kleine Textsammlung trägt zur Verbreitung der Original-Texte bei und ermutigt den ein oder anderen zur Beschäftigung mit diesem Thema. Wir danken den Autoren und Herausgebern der jeweiligen Zeitschriften für Ihre Erlaubnis zum Abdruck.

Hanno Ehrbeck und Klaus Selle
How the Others Plan: Exploring the Shape and Form of Informal Planning
Helen Briassoulis

Abstract
Informal planning, although non-institutionalized, leads to planned outcomes that serve particular interests. The informal planning path runs parallel to or mixes with formal planning, shaping the context of formal planning practice. As the subject of informal planning is very broad and relatively unexplored, this article merely sets the stage for further analysis. It does so by pulling several strands of thought from the literature on the informal planning process, with the aim of understanding and explaining observed socioeconomic and spatial phenomena. The shape, genesis, and causes of informal planning are examined; formal is compared to informal planning; and the design of a typology of informal planning is proposed. To conclude, the main directions of future research on the subject are indicated.

Introduction: Questioning the Given
Despite decades of lengthy theoretical discourses and intense questioning of the dominant planning paradigm, some basic concepts have remained steadfast. Contemporary planning education and conventional knowledge about planning still rest on an understanding of planning that, more or less, takes for granted that (a) planning is a public sector activity and thus an instrument of the state at the antipode of the free market; (b) therefore, planning – functions, means, procedures, and outcomes – is institutionalized and legitimate; and (c) planning is a profession exercised by professionals educated accordingly (Alexander 1992a, 1992b). Formal planning education is based mostly on the four pillars of planning wisdom: planning is rational decision making; planning must be comprehensive; planning is a science; and, planning is value sensitive (Friedmann and Kuester 1994). The professional planner is considered to practice formal planning, as crystallized in rules and norms received through academia and legitimized by state legislation. When formal plans are not implemented or fail to achieve the desired...
outcomes, planning failure or "lack of planning" is said to occur. Even studies of planning practice and planning behavior, which have proliferated since the eighties, primarily concern situations where formal planning is established, legitimized, and enforced.

For some time now, however, planning theorists and practitioners, analyzing real world planning cases, are finding this conventional conception of planning and planners too limited. Planning is a universal human activity, not limited to the public sector, and thus not necessarily institutionalized (e.g., Alexander 1992a, 1992b; Dalton 1989; Forrester 1989; Friedmann 1969; Levy 1992; de Neufville 1983; Peiser 1990). Friedmann and Kuester (1994) recognize modestly that "planners are not the exclusive owners of planning" (61) – a belief echoed frequently in the writings of other theorists (Dalton 1989; Forrester 1989; Levy 1992; Peiser 1990). Government bureaucracies, political organizations, corporations, developers, organized civil society, and other social institutions all share planning functions. As space is continuously modified intentionally for human use, it is planned, but this development is very rarely the product of formal planning processes (Hayden 1994; Cullingworth 1994; Levy 1992; Peiser 1990). In fact, it has been recognized that formal planning success depends critically on the context of planning (Bryson et al. 1990); the study of this context represents an important item of the planning theory research agenda (de Neufville 1983; Dalton 1989).

Increasingly, planners characterize situations as "informal" when a planned end state is observed but the process leading to it is not formal and institutionalized (Nunn 1991; Verma 1995). Although this is not the place for a historic review of the subject, it is worth noting that Banfield (1961) had already talked about the informal structure of influence on public decision making and had distinguished between central decision and social choice. Organizational theorists also have addressed the issue of informal dynamics in organizations (e.g., Etzioni 1964; Downs 1967). Accounts of contemporary planning practice analyze frequently the presence of informal elements within established formal planning systems which are considered a more or less inseparable part of the overall planning process (Nunn 1991; Cullingworth 1994). In fact, "comparisons of the 'end state' of a public project to the outcome envisioned by formal policies will suggest that informal deviations occurred" (Nunn 1991, 279). Recently, Friedmann and Kuester (1994) proposed the integration of nontraditional planning approaches and nonconventional literature into the planning curricula, suggesting, thus, the possible existence of informal planning processes. Since the early seventies, the informal sector literature has finally flourished, drawing especially on Third World planning experience. This literature by economists, anthropologists, sociologists, and planners has provided a wealth of well-documented analyses of noninstitutionalized processes that are pursued to achieve some collective goal such as provision of affordable housing (see, among others, Turner 1968; Peattie 1980; de Soto 1989).

Formal planning – the institutionalized activity carried out under the auspices of the state – is one possible path followed to meet social ends, in the process shaping the physical and socioeconomic world. At the same time, some other planning paths, outside the domain of formal planning, may account for developments occurring without the intervention of formal planning. This other domain is what this study calls the domain of informal planning – planning activities, not institutionalized but, nevertheless, leading to planned outcomes that serve particular interests, although they may serve the broader public interest as well. As the subject is very broad and relatively unexplored, this article has the modest purpose of setting the stage for a systematic analysis of informal planning. It does so by pulling several strands of thought from the literature on the informal sector and reinforcing it with experience culled from informal planning. The aim is to identify the shape of informal
planning, to show differences and similarities between formal and informal planning, and to suggest a typology of the latter.

The informal sector literature conveys the universality of informal activities. Similar arrangements are found in countries and regions at very different levels of economic development; they constitute part of the daily life of individuals and households; and they have increased during the last years (Castells and Portes 1989). Portes et al. (1989) put it succinctly:

The informal economy occupies the distinct position in which labor process and family process often become one, and the basic difficulty in observing the activities that promote this convergence is that they are well concealed from public view (6).

More importantly, informal activities are regular and not random events involving forethought and planning in their conduct (Grossman 1989; Ybarra 1989). Overall, as Fortuna and Prates (1989) notice: "It seems unavoidable that we must resort to the notions of formality and informality in order to explain central processes in the socioeconomic dynamics of modern societies" (78).

Informal activities, thus, are driven by systematic processes that, despite responding to a different logic, possess the characteristics of planning. Informal planning is simply another way of doing planning. In fact, observed end states often result from the interaction of formal and informal planning. In the context of planning education and practice, this article posits that informal planning processes must be brought to the fore and studied thoroughly because they shape the context of (formal) planning practice. If they are ignored, formal plans will address a misspecified model of reality, thus risking ineffectiveness. As an endeavor in planning theory, this study aims to construct a framework to understand and explain observed phenomena in planning practice resting on the belief that "theory should be treated as a kind of reflective inquiry which routinely addresses practical issues (60)"

(Charles Hoch cited in Friedmann and Kuester 1994).

The article first reviews the informal sector literature to identify the basic traits, genesis, types, and implications of informal activities. Informal planning is then analyzed. Its shape, genesis, and causes are described; informal is compared to formal planning; and the design of a typology is suggested. Finally, the implications of the study of informal planning for planning practice and research are discussed.

Informal Sector: The Literature

The concept of the informal sector was introduced into international usage in the literature in 1972 by the report of the International Labor Office Employment Mission in Kenya (Lubell 1991). Initially, informality was associated with deprivation of some kind, poverty, and marginality. This view gradually lost ground as research revealed that informal activities are not necessarily carried out under conditions of deprivation either in the developing or the developed world (Fortuna and Prates 1989; Georgakopoulou 1988; Williams and Windebank 1994). Most recent studies identify informality with lack of regulation and, consequently, lack of institutionalization, nonregistration, and illegality. Informal activities are desirable, productive, and socially tolerated (Capecchi 1989) economic activities – distinguished from undesirable, counterproductive, and criminal activities – that do not comply with legal regulations pertaining to registration, fiscal, employment, social security, health, and other matters in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated (De Soto 1989; Castells and Portes 1989; Roberts 1994). They differ from formal activities mainly with respect to the manner by which a final product is produced and exchanged. The goods and services are in themselves legal, but their production and sale occur outside the regulatory apparatus (Castells and Portes 1989; Sassen-Koob 1989). Naturally, if regulations are not strictly applied, "what is theoretically illegal may well constitute everyday practice" (Lubell
Informal activities are often illegal, but not necessarily clandestine, as lack of coordination between state agencies, lax enforcement and other types of official connivance can permit informally run enterprises to flourish openly (Roberts 1989). The informal sector is an integral component of total national economies defined with reference to the formal sector. Castells and Portes (1989) observe:

Any change in the institutional boundaries of regulation of economic activities produces a parallel realignment of the formal-informal relationship. In fact, it is because there is a formal economy (i.e., an institutional framework of economic activity) that we can speak of the “informal” one. In an ideal market economy, with no regulation of any kind, the distinction between formal and informal would lose meaning since all activities would be performed in the manner we now call informal. ... The more a society institutionalizes its economic activities following collectively defined power relationships and the more individual actors try to escape this institutionalized logic, the sharper the divide between the two sectors. The informal sector grows, even in highly institutionalized economies, at the expense of the already formalized work relationships (12-13).

The causes of informal activities are specific to the societies where informalization takes place, depending on such factors as the specific modes and levels of development, types of social organization, and cultural traditions (Castells and Portes 1989; Peattie 1980). Castells and Portes (1989) summarize the most important of them in the following terms: (a) reaction by both firms and individual workers to the power of organized labor, (b) reaction against the state's regulation of the economy, (c) impact of international competition on all countries (affecting labor-intensive industries in particular), (d) the process of industrialization in many Third World countries that is associated with social and economic conditions that limit enforcement of state regulations, (e) the effects of the economic crisis since the mid-seventies. Almost all studies agree on the broad pattern of causality: The presence of structural problems in a particular area of the economic system causes the creation of a parallel socioeconomic system, which satisfies social needs more effectively (Sassen-Koob 1989; Ybarra 1989). A parallel socioeconomic system may be created, for example, when demand for goods and services in the larger economy, either from final consumers or firms, is greater than the formal system can satisfy (Sassen-Koob 1989).

The state plays an important role, as it is not only the inadequate state provision of goods and services that gives rise to the informal system. In several instances, the state is a principal, conspicuous or inconspicuous, participant in the formation of chat system. Castells and Portes (1989) contend that:

Governments tolerate or even stimulate informal economic activities as a way to resolve potential social conflicts or to promote political patronage. Such is the experience of most squatter settlements in Third World cities, which provide a cheap, easy solution to the housing crisis while predisposing squatters to political allegiance. But it is also the tacit policy of European governments that count on the informal sector to reduce the open rate of unemployment and to provide new incentives to battered national economies. Informalization is not a social process developing outside the purview of the state .... For the (state) the loss of formal control over these activities is compensated by the short-term potential for legitimation and renewed economic growth that they offer (27). Informality has considerable social, economic, physical, and political implications. Informalization is part of a decentralized model of economic organization. The cost of labor diminishes substantially due to the lower status
of informal workers, and the power of organized labor is undermined. Work situations and social conditions become more heterogeneous as the informal economy expands, the more the class structure of a given society becomes blurred (Castells and Portes 1989). The clandestine character of informal activities fosters a climate of general crisis in the formal sector, which actually has little to do with real economic conditions (Ybarra 1989). Informalization reduces or eliminates incentives for technological progress, innovation, and investment as entrepreneurial efforts center on better strategies to conceal clandestine activities. The physical implications of informal activities have been analyzed extensively, especially the development of squatter settlements in Third World countries (de Soto 1989; Turner 1968). Sassen-Koob (1989) describes the development of informal manufacturing districts in New York. Enterprises, operating in violation of various codes, concentrate in areas not zoned for manufacturing and, gradually, attract a whole array of related service shops and large industrial users (due to agglomeration economies). Finally, Nunn (1991) observes that informal policies often modify existing plans and procedures or use no plan at all. Parties and citizens not directly involved are thus affected, and the effectiveness of future formal planning efforts could be limited.

The Domain of Informal Planning: An Analysis
Planning Defined
Synthesizing the most dominant and common elements of the various definitions of planning, Alexander (1992a, 73) defines planning as: "...the deliberate social or organizational activity of developing an optimal strategy of future action to achieve a desired set of goals, for solving novel problems in complex contexts, and attended by the power and intention to commit resources and to act as necessary to implement the chosen strategy." This abstract and universal definition encompasses collective planning activities that are not necessarily institutionalized and not necessarily carried out by professional planners. Planning assumes actors engaging in deliberate decision making with some common interests, goals, aspirations, and needs. When the actors achieve their goals, the outcome is characterized as "planned" (Friedmann 1969).
Planning is a systematic rational choice process (Davidoff and Reiner 1962), where rationality is considered in a broad sociopsychological sense rather than in a narrow technical one (Sager 1995). Consequently, planning is associated with efficiency, coordination, and consistency although it is, bounded by constraints, which frequently are politically structured (Wildavsky 1979; Forster 1989). Actors choose means to satisfy their goals. If appropriate means do not exist and if their needs are pressing, they may devise means (or, they may adapt their goals to the means available). Planning is future-oriented, concerned mostly with uncertain future actions. Thus, it involves prediction of and control over the desired outcomes (Alexander 1992a). Finally, planning is action. Actors possess norms, an image of reality, strategy, tactics, and implementing practices (Friedmann 1995). Implementation is an integral part of the engine that drives the planning process. In fact, planned outcomes are recognized as such after plans have been implemented (Wildavsky 1979).
The present analysis views planning procedurally, as an integrated "goals–end state" process. It starts with actors seeking to satisfy their goals, rationally choosing and using the means available, i.e. acting, under the prevailing circumstances, and ends when the desired outcome is obtained. It is true that, in reality, it may not be easy to observe this process from start to finish as several factors confound its various stages. Moreover, it may not follow the expected order. But the focal, axiomatic thesis of this study is that planning processes are essentially those processes that lead to observed end
states and possess all the distinguishing elements and traits of planning, although they may not be objects of formal regulation and control.\textsuperscript{10}

The Genesis, Shape, and Causes of Informal Planning

The writings of several planners contain the idea of informal planning explicitly or implicitly when they refer to deliberate acts of individuals or interest groups occurring outside the established formal planning apparatus. Paul Davidoff (1965) wrote: "Not every interested group would want to commit itself to a plan; it may be simpler for professionals, politicians or lobbyists to make deals if they have not laid their cards on the table" (334). He alludes, thus, to the fact that certain parties would prefer to follow other than formal planning procedures. Hayden (1994), discussing the physical reorganization of American urban space, hints on the existence of planning with a hidden agenda:

[This] has occurred under the pressure of a conservative coalition of political and economic forces, able to mobilize vast government resources through tax subsidies and public works. The cards are not on the table, and most tax payers would not be able to describe just where their taxes go. It is a high stakes game, played with a marked deck (161).

What the "not formal" processes planners allude to have in common is this: A group of actors seeks to satisfy their (future) goals; they choose rationally, within the constraints of the context, a feasible course of action to proceed as well as any available means and procedures (licit or illicit) to act as required; whenever the formal planning system is obstructive, they bypass the impediments accordingly; they act consistently and persistently; and they stop when they get things done. Apparently, the process just described is a planning process. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it occurs usually outside (or in the shadow of) the formal planning system, hence the term informal planning.

Consequently, informal planning is not institutionalized, not necessarily entirely legal, and not carried out by professional planners or those who can be considered planners in a broad sense (Dalton 1989). The important point is that any observed development results either from formal or from informal planning or both. Hence, true lack of planning is perhaps very rare.\textsuperscript{11} Lack of planning, in general, may characterize those instances where no actors exist seeking to satisfy some goals; hence, no strategies are devised, no action is taken, no change and development are recorded.

The actors of informal planning have shared goals, needs, and demands. These common goals can be met by means of legal planning actions, but the formal, legal actions may not be possible at the time the demand is placed and with the existing procedures (such as the demand for housing); the goals may not have high priority on the government’s agenda; or a formal planning structure may not exist at all or may not cover the service or product demanded.

The actors may act individually pursuing their goals, but they adhere to the same system of values and hence the same problem-solution logic. They tend to use the same means, follow the same procedures, and apply the same tactics. Thus, the actors may not necessarily be a tightly and consistently organized, cohesive group who have agreed to join and act together. They may be a loose, invisibly coordinated social collectivity. Hence, the collective outcome of their actions appears as if it has been (informally) planned.\textsuperscript{12} Examples date from the times when formal planning was not institutionalized and developments occurred without any overt preagreement among the parties involved, as it is with traditional settlements. Contemporary examples include the development of squatter settlements, industrial and service areas in the periphery of urbanized areas, urban development in tourist areas, second home development in undeveloped land, and the social stratification of urban areas.

If the means and procedures needed for plan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>DIFFERENCES</th>
<th>COMMONALITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Public officials, public planners,</td>
<td>Private parties, public officials, organizations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organizations, formal groups</td>
<td>formal/informal groups, A priori unknown, covertly involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Known a priori</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overly involved</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goals/Purpose</strong></td>
<td>Public interest</td>
<td>Private interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of supply of</strong></td>
<td>Public planning legislation</td>
<td>Public planning legislation, informal rules</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>planning</strong></td>
<td>and regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td>Public, legislated means</td>
<td>Public and private means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process/rules</strong></td>
<td>Legislated, prescribed, codified,</td>
<td>Ad hoc, not necessarily legislated and mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mandatory, known a priori,</td>
<td>Disjointed, not overtly coordinated, opportunistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coordinated with other actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End results/states</strong></td>
<td>Predetermined, known a priori,</td>
<td>Not known a priori, formally unpredictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>predictable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magnitude and scope</strong></td>
<td>Occurs at all scales</td>
<td>Local but, aggregately and in the long run, may affect all scales</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Components of the planning process: Differences and commonalities between formal and informal planning.
implementation are not formally and legally available, actors may resort (individually or collectively) to covert, informal, noninstitutionalized, and sometimes illegal means and procedures (e.g. funding from friends or informal lending groups, false documents, illegal appropriation of land for first or second homes). It is probable also that they use absolutely legal means (e.g. state funding) but for purposes other than those for which they are destined formally. In some countries, for example, funds for tourism development have been channelled to industrial or agricultural development or vice versa. The outcome is not as officially planned; it is an informally planned outcome. Finally, the means may be criminal as in the case of setting fires to clear space for development (Briassoulis 1993). The absence of institutional means and rules implies variable timetables; opportunistic conception and implementation of plans; and uncertain exact outcomes, benefits, and costs, even to the directly involved parties.

The end result of informal planning is usually legitimate in a broad societal sense (e.g. housing) although not legal under the formal administrative system (e.g. urban development in areas not annexed to cities, land uses in conflict and in violation of basic safety regulations). Frequently, these end states become objects of formal planning. For example, fringe development or squatter settlements are legalized and provided services long after they are built, or illegal floodplain development is regulated “after the flood.”

Informal planning, then, exhibits both differences from and similarities to formal planning. Table 1 compares the two alternative planning paths in relation to the components of the planning process, while Table 2 compares them in relation to the attributes of the planning process. Three points require emphasis. Firstly, as the two alternative paths are teleologically and morphologically similar in several respects, it is difficult to observe and distinguish them in the real world. This makes it difficult to study them in depth. Moreover, many informal processes are covert, so information about them is not easy to collect.

Secondly, formal and informal planning may differ conspicuously on some dimension but the difference is more quantitative rather than qualitative. On the question of feasibility, for example, formal plans are feasible if formal means exist, while informal plans gain feasibility status by mobilizing a variety of formal and informal means. Lastly, formal and informal planning may exhibit similarities on some dimension but not for the same reasons. For example, in formal planning, opportunism may concern the implementation of formal plans when opportunities arise (Bolan 1967) while in informal planning, opportunism is deeper, penetrating all phases from the conception of the need for planning to its ultimate materialization.

The causes of informal planning are grouped into two main categories – demand-driven and supply-driven – as the need for informal planning arises either out of excessive demand for or inadequate supply of specific planning functions and products. Most of the time, it is the interplay of demand- and supply-driven factors that explains and determines the emergence of particular forms of informal planning.

**Demand-Driven Causes**

Demand-driven causes refer to situations where demand for a product, service, or, in general, a desirable end state (e.g. a physical arrangement) is nor met by formal planning. This may be due to: (a) new types of demand not met by existing planning mechanisms, (b) magnitude of demand in excess of the capacity of formal planning, (c) demand for a particular end state not having high priority on the government's agenda or possessing qualitative characteristics (some of which may be illegal) that cannot attract adequate state interest, (d) demand for immediate action that cannot be met in the formal system’s time frame, or (e) those placing the demand preferring alternative ways to meet their needs and bypassing, instead of using, the formal planning apparatus. Evidently, it is important to examine
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legality/legitimacy</td>
<td>Legislated, legal, explicit laws and regulations</td>
<td>Not legislated mostly Evades the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity</td>
<td>Overtly regular</td>
<td>Covertly regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Overt action</td>
<td>Mostly covert and clandestine, Visible/identifiable after the fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Public, legislated means Visible before the fact</td>
<td>Informally achieved and effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>Predetermined</td>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility/adaptability</td>
<td>Low mostly</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social acceptance</td>
<td>Assumed, explicit</td>
<td>Implicit, acquired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Contingent on availability of formal resources</td>
<td>Achieved through formal and informal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk/uncertainty</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2. Attributes of the planning process: Differences and commonalities between formal and informal planning.*
who demands planning action as those who possess power (economic, political, or both) may be able to satisfy their demand by violating or changing the rules of the formal system.\textsuperscript{13}

**Supply-Driven Causes**

Supply-driven causes refer to the alternative planning supply systems employed when the formal system cannot meet a particular demand for planning action. An inadequate supply of planning may be due to: (a) complete absence of formal planning, (b) incomplete or nonexistent enforcement of planning provisions, (c) inadequate resources (money, personnel, expertise, rime) for planning, (d) lack of provisions for certain kinds (foreseeable or not) of planning action in the current system or purposeful retreat of the state from the regulation of certain activities, (e) existing provisions prohibitive for certain, socially desirable, kinds of planning action, (f) inadequate or totally absent (at a given time) political will to satisfy a given type of demand, or (g) incorrect timing of planning action.\textsuperscript{14} Variations of the demand- and supply-driven causes as well as of their relationships within a given socioeconomic and political and cultural setting give rise to particular forms of informal planning. These are examined in the next section

**A Proposed Typology of Informal Planning**

In order to classify the diverse forms of informal planning, a three-level hierarchy of criteria is assumed. The three levels of criteria are explained below, and a first typology of informal planning is designed to offer a systematic basis for analyzing the particularities of each type as well as its effects, evolution, and relationship with the formal planning system.

The first level criteria are used to generate the major types of informal planning. Three such criteria are proposed drawing from the generating causes of informal planning: (a) degree of state regulation, enforcement, and institutionalization of planning, (b) demand for planning, and (c) cost of planning.\textsuperscript{15} The first criterion refers to the operational formal-informal distinction and concerns the extent to which the state intervenes deliberately into the socioeconomic and spatial relationships with its various instruments (taxation and social, economic, and planning legislation and regulations) as well as the extent to which state policies are enforced. It may range from total absence of state planning to complete state control of all planning functions. The demand for a planning criterion ranges from low to high and is determined basically by the real demand for a service, function, end state (e.g. housing, recreation space, etc.); the degree of organization/cohesion among those demanding the product of planning (the consumers); and the amount of economic and political power these consumers command. The cost of a state planning criterion, finally, is determined in part by the legislative and administrative effort required to meet a given demand; the pecuniary and nonpecuniary (e.g. time, expertise, personnel, political cost) resources that must be committed to satisfy this demand; and the uncertainty associated with satisfying a given type of demand (especially at the implementation stage).

The second level criteria are more specific, concern qualitative features of the first level criteria, and provide for variations within the major types. These include various forms of state regulation and enforcement, which may differ according to the object of planning; variations in demand (e.g. demand of what, by whom, when, and for how long); and the level of socioeconomic organization and development. Finally, the third level criteria are more focused and disaggregated to more accurately approximate the observed informal planning structure as well as to capture its finer variations due to the physical and socio-cultural particularities of the spatial context and the personal and psychological qualities of the actors involved. These include size of settlement, type and availability of housing, level of affluence and
employment, industrial structure, local and regional traditions, social norms and moralities, social networks, socioeconomic mix, and educational level (Williams and Windebank 1994). It should be noted that time, an important classification variable, is taken into account implicitly in the present typology. The evolution of informal planning types over time is an important topic, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.

Before developing the typology based on the above criteria, two filter questions are addressed, as shown in Figure 1. The first concerns the existence of formal planning. If there is no formal planning system, a market system is usually said to exist. This may be appropriate, however, for economic affairs where planning and the market are considered opposites, although this thesis tends to be gradually abandoned (see Alexander 1992b). But for human affairs involving intangible goods, services, and transactions for which no markets exist (e.g., environmental and social affairs), absence of formal planning is tantamount to a pure form of informal planning. It is proposed then to subsume all these cases under the term preinstitutional (archaic or primitive) informal planning.16

Relevant examples can be found in the physical and socioeconomic organization of preindustrial human settlements, in general, or in the organization and use of sacred places of certain (mostly ancient) cultures. But in modern societies also, open space is often organized informally to serve functions such as recreation, celebrations, and symbolic organization of social life (meeting points and areas of reference), circulation routes acquire functions not originally contemplated or planned, and so on.

If a formal planning system exists, the second filter question concerns the enforcement of formal planning. If there is no enforcement, then informal planning prevails in a form that is similar morphologically (and perhaps indistinguishable) from the preinstitutional type. This form can be called parallel planning. Lack of enforcement may be due to lax political climate (state regulation legislated only for symbolic reasons), changes in administration (legislation passed in the previous administration not enforced by the next administration), low demand, lack of resources, or market forces stronger than state planning. This situation is exploited by those parties that find it more beneficial to operate outside the official planning system (Hayden 1994). Industrial growth in many developed and developing countries does not evolve, spatially or sectorally, according to legislated industrial planning and does not utilize the available instruments (e.g. industrial development incentives). Instead, it occurs informally subject to the dictates of domestic and international markets as well as the idiosyncratic decisions of entrepreneurs. Similarly, environmental protection frequently is carried out informally as formal planning remains inactive (and mostly symbolic at least for some time) for the reasons mentioned above. If formal planning is enforced, in varying degrees, several operational forms of informal planning arise. When the full range of values of the three first level criteria are combined, the broader and more common domain of informal planning is covered, as Figures 2, 3, and 4 show. In Figure 2, four extreme possibilities appear. Very low demand for planning action and no state regulation make the case for no planning. On the other hand, very high demand and strong state regulation and enforcement of planning are normally associated with formally planned outcomes. Baron Hausmann’s Paris as well as public housing provided in several countries are examples of such outcomes. Complete social choice17 exists when state regulation is very low but demand for planning is very high. This is a case of pure informal planning, the parallel type mentioned before. Several social services and facilities not provided by the state develop informally, especially at the local level (e.g., informal social and job networks, playgrounds). Even the formation of the so-called urban villages may be explained in this perspective. The fourth extreme case occurs when state regulation is high but demand for
规划是低。然后，规划系统可能解决错误的问题。例如，规划努力可能被转向对低需求问题（例如，住房、收入支持）而需求在推动其他问题（例如，永久性就业）。在这些四种极端之间，非正式规划的领域延伸，其各种具体形式在其他因素（第二和第三级标准）的影响下形成。变化在规划的成本与国家的制度管理及规划的需要之间相结合，导致规划要么避免或对规划进行正式规划（正式规划）要么对某种形式的非正式规划。

图3显示了组合规划成本和对规划需求的三种极端可能性。低于最低水平的需求在对规划时，实际上没有案例。两个规划路径基本在对规划的需求高于该最低水平。非正式规划，与正式规划并存，发展并占据高价值的领域和对规划的成本。旅游业的发展（住宿、辅助设施和服务）在具有高风景或文化价值的地方是一个非正式规划的一个例子，其中规划涉及高成本并结合非常高需求。

最后，图4显示了当与国家制度管理的规划成本相关时的三种极端可能性。非正式或正式规划是被采取在规划成本非常高且制度管理要么缺席要么非常低时。例如，特定濒危物种的保护是问题性因为涉及高成本且相关的制度管理是微弱或根本不存在。当规划成本和制度管理高时，使用正式规划是自然的。当规划成本低和制度管理低时，使用正式规划是自然的。当非正式规划可能与正式规划并存时，这在低成本服务和正式规划系统，低成本服务是上下文特定。然而，非正式规划可能与正式规划并存，两种情况是相反的。第一种情况
**Figure 2.** State regulation versus demand for planning.

**Figure 3.** Cost of planning versus demand for planning.
is when state regulation is fully enforced and the cost of planning is high. Formal planning action is conditional, then, on the availability of public resources, such as road or bridge building in high demand areas. If resources are not readily available and demand is high, it is possible (but more risky because of potential penalties) that planning action is taken by means of informal procedures. This action could then mean informal substitutes for formal planning, such as private access roads or subdivisions in rural areas. The second is when state regulation is weak and the cost of planning is low. Two possibilities exist again especially if demand is pressing; either the state undertakes planning action or the task is subject to informal planning. Of course, both cases may occur simultaneously. Fringe development on marginal areas in various countries is one example where state control of land development in these areas is weak and the cost of planning is relatively low (cheap land). Either squatters develop the land or the state may build low income housing. Other forms of informal planning may be distinguished for various combinations of the values of the cost of planning and degree of state regulation and with the application of second and third level criteria. The typology can be extended by applying second level criteria. To avoid tedious analyses of the multitude of possible variations, the informal planning types resulting from variations in the form and scope of state regulation/enforcement (the basis of the formal/informal relationship) are shown in Figure 5. At one end, informal planning substitutes fully for all functions of formal planning (as in several preindustrial societies). At the other, formal planning rules completely as in the case of certain centralized planning systems (former Soviet Union or People’s Republic of China); these, however, did not prove to be immune to the development of informal activities (Grossman 1989).

One intermediate type – the complementary type – involves in part informal planning, applying to activities not regulated by the state, and in part formal planning, applying to all other activities under state regulation (enforcement being variable, however, thus generating more variations). For example, siting of hazardous facilities in countries without pertinent legislation and active spatial planning is based mostly on private considerations and frequently results in violations of basic health and safety standards as well as in land use conflicts (e.g., ammunition plants located adjacent to oil tank yards). Another instance is when individuals join spontaneously or get organized to satisfy demand for a service or end state (e.g., private nature conservation organizations acquiring land to protect it from development).

Another intermediate type – the supplementary type – occurs when informal replaces formal planning if the latter proves unenforceable and ineffective, or when demand is so high that the formal system cannot satisfy it within a reasonable time. Informal planning may encompass all or a selection of state regulated activities depending on the strength of demand for (effective) planning (e.g., first and second homes, social services, resort development). One variation of the supplementary relationship is the symbiotic relationship where formal and informal means and procedures intermingle in the process of producing a specific planning outcome (see Nunn 1991). Another is the antagonistic relationship where informal procedures attempt to supersede formal ones if the latter do not benefit some parties (e.g., planning for industrial development in locations favorable to local strong economic interests and not in locations “scientifically” more suitable). One reason why the supplementary type (and its variants) may arise is that formal policies are frequently vague and implementers, in order to proceed, inevitably provide their own interpretations. Officials may also engage in entrepreneurial decision making to get things done (Nunn 1992, Cullingworth 1994). Cullingworth (1994), commenting on this case as observed in the U.S., France, and Great Britain, concludes: “…the formal system exists largely in law books and the informal system makes
Figure 4. Cost of planning versus state regulation/enforcement of planning.

Figure 5. The formal/informal planning continuum.
it workable" (165). Of course, during implementation, which is usually remote from the formal planning level, formal implementers may bend or variously interpret the legislated plans, rules, and procedures or may pass new rules (if they have the power to do so) to facilitate particular arrangements and outcomes beneficial to some interested party. This particular type of action arises in cases of state complicity, weakness, and corruption (Jimenez 1989). Evidently, the list of possible types of informal planning is very long and may change over time, with some types vanishing and some others appearing. The common feature of all types is that, paraphrasing Castells and Portes (1989), they do not result from the intrinsic characteristics of activities but from the social definition of state intervention.

Epilogue: Probing Further

Castells and Portes (1989), closing their introductory chapter in The Informal Economy, write: “For many years, social scientists and policy makers in the advanced world proceeded as if the only economy worth studying and acting upon was that recorded in the official statistics. This book will have accomplished its purpose if it helps to put to rest such a comforting but dangerous illusion" (7). The same hope is expressed for the attempt to analyze informal planning in this paper. Professional planners are called to plan in a world where formal planning provides just one out of many possible ways to satisfy societal needs and goals. The ”other planners” and the domain of informal planning shape the context of formal planning practice both in the developing and the developed world. Hence, they need to be studied in the same way other elements of a planning problem are studied (e.g., socioeconomic and environmental conditions, institutional and legislative setting, etc.). More importantly, however, the outcomes of informal planning often constitute part of the problems formal planning is called to address as it is the case with the environmental and socioeconomic externalities of informal activities (e.g., illegal housing and improperly sited hazardous installations). In addition, informal planning may impede the smooth application of formal planning as it may distort the functioning of markets (such as the land market through land speculation) or organizations involved in one way or another in formal planning. Therefore, the study of informal planning will contribute, at a minimum, to better planning, problem definitions, and specifications as well as to the design of more effective solutions – those that address the real problems being faced. In this perspective, formal planning education has the primary responsibility to offer planning students the requisite knowledge on informal planning in the context of planning theory courses and/or of analyses of planning practice and the politicalization of planning.  

Practice needs support from appropriate research. Firstly, it is important to elaborate broadly accepted operational definitions of informal planning and distinguish it from formal planning. On this basis, the history, emergence, and evolution of informal planning in different historical and geographical contexts deserve thorough study. Such a study could uncover the conditions under which this planning path prevails and feed research on the systematic, documented analysis of the conditions that foster the genesis and conduct of informal planning. More focused research may examine the various public and private actors involved in informal planning and their roles, patterns, and evolution of their relationships over time and with changes in socioeconomic and political conditions. Development of elaborate informal planning typologies, based on empirical evidence, is needed also for the systematic analysis of the manifestations of informal planning. To support and frame planning practice, finally, an important research question is how to cope with informal planning and its outcomes. Input from the findings of all previous research questions, as well as from the analysis of successful and unsuccessful planning case studies, will suggest practical ways to plan in the presence of
informal planning.
Informal planning is defined always in relation to formal planning, the extent and force of the latter being socially determined and, thus, variable over space and time. The study of informal planning, then, cannot stop when all research subjects are covered; it is a subject of continuing planning research, as so many formal planning subjects are. Eventually, its study should be incorporated fully in the planning curriculum to inform more enlightened future planning practice.

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Notes
1. The term informal may not be entirely appropriate but a common term is needed to denote the similarity of planning processes and practice amid very different environments and facilitate the study of the manifold forms they take and the differing significance for the actors involved and for society at large. The literature includes alternative terms for informal processes: nonstandard, underground, illegal, hidden, shadow, unobserved, submerged, irregular, invisible, unofficial, parallel, silent, alternative, world underneath, paraplaning, opaque planning, shadow state.
2. Banfield (1961) defines the informal structure of influence as “the behavior of individuals within the formal structure and the actions they take in order that the elaborate checks and balances of formal decentralization can be overcome with informal centralization” (325-326).
3. Bolan (1967) comments: “It is the wide gap between ‘central decisions’ and ‘social choice’ which frustrates and thwarts the efforts of the professional planner. The ‘tension’ between the two may be ‘in eradicable’ (according to Banfield) but substantial evidence suggests that planners are making a wide variety of efforts to accommodate it” (237).
4. Nunn (1992, 279) notes: “Public planners and municipal managers must be willing to negotiate with developers to resolve the gray areas of formal policies or extraordinary circumstances of individual projects .... It is naive to expect public decision makers to rely blindly on formal policy documents to dose ventures with real estate interests” (279).
5. According to this report, informality is a way of doing things characterized by: (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) family ownership of resources; (d) small scale of operation; (e) labor-intensive and adapted technology; (f) skills acquired outside the formal school system; (g) unregulated and competitive markets (Lubell 1991).
6. “The informal economy is not a euphemism for poverty. It is a specific form of relationships of production, while poverty is an attribute linked to the process of distribution” (Castells and Portes 1989, 12).
7. Several broad paradigms have been proposed to explain the emergence and heterogeneous nature of the informal sector whose discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See, among others, Georgakopoulou (1988), Pontes et al. (1989), Williams and Windebank (1994).
8. De Soto (1989) emphasizes the development of an extralegal system regulating relationships among informals (in establishing settlements, in the acquisition and sale of quasi-property rights, etc.) whose rules are adhered to while the formal body of laws is virtually ignored or bypassed.
9. Similarly, Friedmann (1969) had suggested: “Planning, in its most generalized form, is a ubiquitous activity; all deliberate actions consider the value implications of choice, imply a knowledge of alternatives foregone, attempt to relate means to ends efficiently, and correct ongoing actions on the basis of information about their results” (312).
10. This assertion is based on the notion of teleological similarity (Verma 1993). Formal and informal planning are teleologically similar as both represent purposeful activities directed to needs satisfaction. The ensuing discussion makes explicit the reference classes which form the basis of similarity between the two alternative planning paths.
11. The absence of public planning is usually associated with the free market or power politics (Alexander 19926, Fischler 1995). It is argued, however, that, even in the free market or in power politics, people always apply forethought, choose the proper
means, tactics and procedures and act rationally to achieve their goals; in, other words they exercise planning. All these instances of planning are teleologically similar.

12. This is one case of the “tyranny of small decisions” as analyzed by Kahn (1966).

13. Nunn (1992, 275) observes: “Business interests dissatisfied with formal policies can appeal to elected officials or the courts for special consideration.”

14. Cullingworth (1994) observes: “It is true that in some areas of great development pressure, action has been taken and that a feasible model of state planning exists. But the problem is that there is no incentive to act until severe development pressures arise; and then it may be too late since every landowner can see a potential windfall profit that might vanish under stronger planning controls” (166).

15. This design borrows from the typology of policy types of Salisbury and Heinz (1970).

16. Even in the case of economic affairs, Castells and Pontes (1989) have been already cited: “In an ideal market economy, the distinction between formal and informal would mean, since all activities would be performed in the manner we now call informal...” (12–13). However, even the concept of the market may be limited like the concept of formal planning. An ideal market system is a theoretical construct whose assumptions are violated mostly in reality. The present discussion proposes to view all processes occurring in the absence of formal systems and leading to certain patterns and outcomes as manifestations of pure informal planning.

17. Banfield’s (1961) term social choice is preferred to the term market as it is broader in meaning.

18. I owe the clarification of this case to the constructive comment of one reviewer.

19. In the case of public policy implementation, Nunn (1991) identifies two types of behavior: In one, developers engage public officials in ad hoc negotiations; because negotiation strategies are unpredictable, informal policies are risky. In another, public officials waive or alter standards in response to persistent or tenacious requests by business interests. Cullingworth (1994, 165) cites Booth (1989, 413): “The search for certainty through the legalization of plans is a delusion. Bargaining is as much of the French system as it is of the U.S., British and the Dutch.”

20. The politization of planning decisions is a reality planners have to cope with (Reiser 1990; Friedmann and Kuester 1994) and proposals to politicize the content of planning theory courses have been made already (Beauregard 1995). In addition, as the reaching of planning practice is gaining considerable support recently (Innes 1995), including the study of informal planning in this context appears appropriate and timely.

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Planning through debate\(^1\). The communicative turn in planning theory\(^2\)

Patsy Healey

Abstract
This article proposes an approach to planning which aims to realise the democratic potential of planning in the contemporary conditions of societies with developed economies and diverse social structures. Any claim for the relevance of planning in such societies has to confront the challenges to the planning idea from both the resurgence of economic evaluation within public policy, and, more fundamentally, the philosophical post-modernist critique of scientific rationalism. It is argued in this article that the Habermasian conception of inter-subjective reasoning among diverse discourse communities, drawing on technical, moral and expressive-aesthetic ways of experiencing and understanding, can provide a direction for the invention of forms and practices of a planning behaviour appropriate for societies which seek progressive ways of collectively ‘making sense together while living differently’. The article draws on the work of a number of contemporary writers in the field of planning theory to present an outline of such an approach, and its implications for the contemporary practices of environmental planning.

This article is about what ‘planning’ can be taken to mean in contemporary democratic societies. Its context is the dilemma faced by all those committed to planning as a democratic enterprise, aimed to promote social justice and environmental sustainability. The dilemma is that the technical and administrative machineries advocated and created to pursue these goals in the past have been based on what we now see as a narrow scientific rationalism. These machineries have further compromised the development of a democratic attitude, and have failed to achieve the goals promoted. So how can we now support a renewal of the enterprise of planning? If we can, what are its forms and principles? The article is written specifically for those planners in Britain, in planning schools and in planning practice, who have shared a particular experience of the 1970s

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and 1980s. The 1970s provided us with a soft social and environmental commitment and a hard political critique of the enterprise of planning. In this critique, planning was a site of struggle between class forces for control of the management of the urban environment. By the 1980s, this critique had itself dissolved into a search for a less one-dimensional view of conflict and cleavage in society and a more nuanced life and environment. This search for a democratic pluralism took place, however, against the harsh backcloth of the Thatcherite hegemonic agenda. This set out to destroy not merely democratic socialist thought and practices, but the very enterprise of urban management and planning which was the object of the democratic socialist critique. The Thatcherite project has now been brought to a remarkably sudden halt as a political idea, though many of the practices it instituted remain. Citizen responsiveness, environmental sustainability, as vague political principles, are now widely asserted, as in the general idea of environmental planning and the specific principle of a plan-led regulatory land-use planning system. But what kind of a planning can be compatible with our contemporary understandings of a democratic attitude? And how can the concept of planning survive the contemporary philosophical challenges to materialism, modernism and rationalism, these central pillars of the traditions of 'modernity' which dominated Western thought from the middle of last century until late into the present one? How can there be a 'planning' without 'unifying' conceptions of systems and structures, based on scientific knowledge, from which to articulate hypotheses as to key relationships and appropriate interventions? How can decisions be arrived at without systematic 'rational' procedures for knowledgeable and collective 'deciding and acting'? Throughout the past decade, signs of alternative conceptions of planning purposes and practices have been increasingly identified and debated in planning theory. One route to imagining alternatives has focused on substantive issues, moving from material analyses of options for local economies exposed to global capitalism, to concerns with culture, consciousness, community and 'placeness'. Another has taken a 'process' route, exploring the communicative dimensions of collectively debating and deciding on matters of collective concern. The problem with the substantive route is its a priori assumptions of what is 'good/bad', 'right/wrong'. Local economic development is presented as often 'good', national economic intervention as oppressive, 'bad'. By what knowledge and reasoning has this been arrived at? If such principles are embodied in our plans, will we not have fallen yet again into the trap of imposing the reasoning of one group of people on another? Does the process route offer a way out of this dilemma of relativism which treats every position as merely someone's opinion, and hence the dominance of a position pursued through planning strategies and their implementation as nothing more than the outcome of a power game?

This article argues that it can. The argument is explored firstly by a brief review of the idea of planning and its challenges. The article then identifies five directions for the management of the urban environment which seem to be prefigured in present discussions. Of these, it is argued that the conception of planning as a communicative enterprise holds most promise for a democratic form of planning in the contemporary context. The article concludes with some implications for the systems and practices of environmental planning.

Throughout, the contextual 'locus' of the article is environmental planning in Britain, although this merely allows the purposes and practices for planning to be developed in a specific context. More generally, the challenge for planning in the contemporary era lies at the heart of our efforts to reinterpret a progressive meaning for democracy in Western societies.
The idea of planning and its challenges
As with so much of Western culture, the contemporary idea of planning is rooted in the enlightenment tradition of 'modernity.' This freed individuals from the intellectual tyranny of religious faith and from the political tyranny of despots. Such free individuals, in democratic association, could, it was believed then and since, combine in one way or another, to manage their collective affairs. By the application of scientific knowledge and reason to human affairs, it would be possible to build a better world, in which the sum of human happiness and welfare would be increased. For all our consciousness of the errors of democratic management in the past two centuries, it is difficult not to recognise the vast achievements that this intellectual and political enlightenment has brought.

This modern idea of planning, as Friedmann has described in his authoritative account of its intellectual origins, is centrally linked to concepts of democracy and progress. It centres on the challenge of finding ways in which citizens, through acting together, can manage their collective concerns, with respect to the sharing of space and time.

In this century, Mannheim's advocacy of a form of planning which harnessed systematised social scientific knowledge and techniques to the management of collective affairs in a democratic society proved inspirational for the influential Chicago school of rational decision making. A procedural view evolved which presented planning as a progressive force for economic and social development in a world where democracy and capitalism were seen to co-exist in comfortable consensus. It challenged populist 'clientelism' (as in Chicago in the 1950s) as much as idealist totalitarianism.

But as with any progressive force, procedures developed with a progressive democratic intention may be subverted for other purposes. In the early 1970s, this subversion was identified with the power of capitalist forces to dominate everyone's life opportunities.

Environmental planning, it was argued, put the needs of capital (through regional economic development and the implicit opportunities for land and property markets created by planning regimes) before citizens and the environment.

However, a more fundamental challenge to the Mannheimian notion of planning was gathering force, through the critique of scientific reason itself. German critical theorists and French 'deconstructionists' elaborated ideas which challenged reason's dominance of human affairs. Reason, understood as logic coupled with scientifically-constructed empirical knowledge, was unveiled as having achieved hegemonic power over other ways of being and knowing, crowding out moral and aesthetic discourses. Further, rationalising power dominated the very institutions set up in the name of democratic action, the bureaucratic agencies of the state. Following Foucault's analysis, planning could be associated with the dominatory power of systematic reason pursued through state bureaucracies. Evidence for this seemed to be everywhere, from the disaster of high-rise tower blocks for the poor to the dominance of economic criteria justifying road projects and the functional categorisation of activity zones which worked for large industrial companies and those working in them, but not for women (with their necessarily complex lifestyle), the elderly and disabled, and many ethnic groups forced to discover ways of existing on the edge of established economic practices.

This 'challenge to systematised reason', and with it, to the planning enterprise, strikes at the heart of the enlightenment project, or, as we now understand it, the project of 'modernity'. The challenge is now labelled as 'post-modernist', drawing on a terminology first developed in art and architectural critique. But whereas post-modernism in architecture is primarily a critique of a particular paradigm and style within Western art and architecture, philosophical post-modernism challenges the foundations or two hundred years of Western thought.
The post-modern challenge to Western thought is both progressive and regressive in its potential, as was the idea of systematised reason. It is also highly diverse, with different lines of development. Only some of these claim to replace the ‘project of modernity’ with that of post-modernity. Others, following the position of the economic geographer Harvey, and the critical theorist Habermas, seek new ways of reconstituting the ‘incomplete’ project of modernity. Some of the strands of post-modernist debate leave space for a form of planning, i.e. for collective activity. Others dismiss planning as, variously, impossible, irrelevant or oppressive.

Moore Milroy, reviewing the development of the post-modernist debate in planning thought, identifies four ‘broad characteristics’ to the challenge postmodernism presents to modernism.

It is deconstructive in the sense of questioning and establishing a sceptical distance from conventional beliefs and, more actively, trying both to ascertain who derives value from upholding their authority and to displace them; antifoundationalist in the sense of dispensing with universals as bases of truth; nondualistic in the sense of refusing the separation between subjectivity and objectivity along with the array of dualisms it engenders including the splits between truth and opinion, fact and value; and encouraging of plurality and differentes.17

This double challenge, to the tendency for progressive values to be destroyed by the very systems created to promote them, and to the systems of technocratic rationalist thought which have underpinned so much of Western and Eastern bloc thinking about planning, seems so powerful as to be fatal to the idea of planning. Is there any way out? It is argued in this article not only that there is, via the development of communicative forms of planning, but also, following Harvey and Habermas, that some directions of the ‘post-modern challenge’ to planning need to be actively resisted as in their turn regressive and undemocratic. Current debate suggests several ‘routes for invention’ of a new planning. Five such ‘routes’ or directions are outlined here. These directions are not necessarily exclusive. Their presentation in the planning literature varies in its coherence. They are offered as a sketch of possibilities, through which to foreground the promise of a communicative form of planning in promoting and realising a progressive democratic attitude.

**Directions for a new planning**

The five directions discussed are:

1. A retreat to the bastions of scientific rationalism as expressed through neoclassical economics. Planning is reformulated to provide a framework of rules to ensure collectively experienced impacts are addressed through the price mechanism.
2. An idealism based on fundamental moral or aesthetic principle. Planning purposes and practices would be directed to realising this principle.
3. A relativism in which self-conscious individuals assert their own principles and ‘mutually’ adjust when they get in each other’s way. Planning has little purpose in this route except as deconstructive technique, to reveal ‘dominatory’ systems in order to remove them.
4. Enlarged conceptions of democratic socialism beyond economic struggles over material conditions, to incorporate other loci of ‘cleavage’, such as gender and race, and allow more space for cultural issues (moral and aesthetic). This refocuses the purposes and practices of planning around a reformulated substantive agenda.
5. A communicative conception of rationality, to replace that of the self-conscious autonomous subject using principles of logic and scientifically formulated empirical knowledge to guide
actions. This new conception of reasoning is arrived at by an inter-subjective effort at mutual understanding. This refocuses the practices of planning, to enable purposes to be communicatively discovered.

The Principle of Price
This conception ignores most of the debates and challenges just discussed, and continues the rationalist project. In conformity with the post-enlightenment tradition, individuals are constituted as autonomous subjects, confronting the object-world. They allocate their resources according to their subjectively perceived wants, and their material opportunities. Public policy facilitates this allocatory process by authoritative structures (rules) based on 'market information' about supply, demand, and the blockages to market exchange. Environmental planning comes into play to conserve assets which are not readily traded in the market place (national parks, wildlife reserves, historic buildings, agricultural land) and to ensure that the actions of individuals do not impose excessive costs on neighbours, communities and environments. As far as possible, such a planning should proceed by pricing strategies which require everyone to internalise these external costs. Only when this is difficult to enforce or where positive conservation is required, should regulatory intervention be used. David Pearce's approach to environmental economics provides a clear example of how 'environmental sustainability' objectives could be achieved in this paradigm.18

Though hesitantly and inconsistently, it is this route which was followed by the British government in the 1980s.19 Some planning theorists have been developing its dimensions in the planning field.20 It has been a dominant tradition for some years in the United States, and is now being vigorously developed in Britain in ideas for traffic management and an 'impact fee' approach to planning gain. But, as environmental debates clearly illustrate, it proceeds ignorant of any doubts about the supreme power of scientific rationalism, and assumes that most aesthetic and moral issues can be converted into priceable preferences.21

It is not hard to see the domintory force of scientific rationalism at work here. This is not to argue that such an approach is never appropriate; merely that it is but one possibility among many. We may criticise its practitioners for their failure to grasp that it 'lives together' with other ways of making policy issues manageable, and we may criticise governments and knowledge production institutions for prioritising it above others. If post-modernism has any progressive meaning, it must mean that this direction for planning turns away from, rather than towards, the challenge of 'making sense together while living differently'.

Idealist Fundamentalism
Several strands of contemporary post-modern critique focus on unmasking the corrupting power of scientific rationalism at the heart of our thought, to reveal deeper unifying principles which hold our world together.22 From this perspective individuals are constituted not as autonomous subjects responsible for their own actions, but as bearers and interpreters of a metaphysical principle. This principle becomes the locus of moral and aesthetic order, and its contemplation fosters a reflective 'interiorisation' of experience rather than 'acting in the world'.23 The preoccupation is with existence, with being, rather than a collective 'exteriorised' enterprise of becoming something different and better in the world. While such a fundamentalism has progressive force in releasing and legitimating people's search for a moral basis for their lives, it also contains within it a domimatory potential. Examples of this can be seen in the adoption of religious codes in public spheres (for example, the British 1988 Education Act's requirement for a 'daily corporate act of worship of an essentially Christian nature') or proposals for environmental actions irrespective of their economic and social consequences justified in terms of scientifically and aesthetically
constructed notions of ecological apocalypse. Planning in this context becomes either an irrelevance to the contemplative interior life or an expression of the metaphysical principle (as in, for example, Chinese *fung schiu* or Islamic principles for environmental planning derived from the Koran). In essence, this direction merely replaces one unidimensional hegemony (rationalism) with another (a particular moral principle). It is hard to see how such an approach can advance the project of progressive democratic pluralism.

**Aesthetic Relativism**

Others elevate experience and the aesthetic mode to the central dimension of human life. This focuses on the self-conscious autonomous individual, existing, being, to be extricated from the oppression of functional systems based on scientific rationalism. Within this conception, there is no unifying metaphysical source, to be contemplatively revealed once the reasoning dominance has been unmasked. Instead, all interpretations are valid. The unifier of humanity is merely the experiential capacity. This leads to a celebration and enjoyment of differences,

but experienced individually rather than collectively. No criteria seem to be available for distinguishing one person's interpretations and actions from another's, since to distinguish would involve recourse to reason or idealist beliefs. All have equivalent standing; all have validity through interior reflection. The much-criticised outcome is a potentially regressive idealist nihilism. The dominatory potential within this strand of post-modernism is of enraged anarchistic violence between individuals and groups struggling to stake out the territory within which their purposes and practices can prevail. The Western media’s portrayal of inter-ethnic and factional strife in the former USSR and Yugoslavia provides examples of what this could mean. If planning has any role at all in this direction, it is to stake out and defend boundaries and at the same time to foster the celebration of difference. But without a discursive reasoning capacity, it is difficult to see what practices could constitute such a planning. To argue this is not to reject the importance of aesthetic and emotional experience in forming our understandings and values. It is the *prioritising* of a particular dimension of experience and understanding (in this case the aesthetic) above all others which compromises the project of progressive democratic pluralism. The progressive challenge is instead to find ways of acknowledging different ways of experiencing and understanding, while seeking to ‘make sense together’.

**Extending Modernity’s Tolerance**

Another route has been to develop the socialist project beyond a preoccupation with material conditions and economic classes. This project, whether in Marxian or democratic humanist forms, aims to develop a society in which the conditions of material existence are adequate for all, and in which everyone has the opportunity to work in conditions where we are justly rewarded and respected for the work we do and in which we have real control over the economic and political conditions of the societies in which we live. Marxist analysis conceived of individuals as selfconscious and reflective. But people’s perceptions and worth were seen as constituted by the material conditions of the societies in which we live, and specifically by the mode of production. Through scientific historical analysis, people could become aware of this, and through collective action, change the conditions of our existence. Planning thus became the means for redesigning less oppressive societies than those dominated by feudal, capitalist and colonial power.

But scientific materialism as the basis for the socialist project in retrospect engendered a domination by state bureaucrats pursuing scientific management principles in the name of working class power (in Eastern European countries, often in highly corrupt forms). Moral principles and aesthetic consensus were interpreted within a set of scientific ‘laws’ about economic class interests. By the 1970s in Britain and
elsewhere, many socialist thinkers were identifying similar tendencies within the welfare state machinery of Western capitalist economies. Critiques developed which firstly highlighted power-distributing cleavages other than economic class, notably those of gender and race, and secondly sought to break out of a 'totalising' scientific rationalism. The new socialism of the 1980s in Britain has been concerned with developing a pluralist understanding of people’s needs, values and ways of experiencing oppression. Appreciating diversity and recognising differences are key elements in this conception, requiring collective action to be informed by principles of tolerance and respect. There is not one route to progress, but many, not one form of reasoning but many. The socialist project thus comes to focus on both restructuring the control of economies and the flow of the fruits of material effort, while at the same time discovering ways of 'living together differently but respectfully.' Planning retains its traditional importance in socialist thought, but the planning enterprise is refocused to recognise diverse forms of disadvantage. The frame of reference of these efforts remains a struggle for opportunities for the disadvantaged against a systematically understood capitalist world order. This provides a frame of reasoning which interprets and selects among the various claims for attention which a pluralist socialism can generate. But where does this frame of reasoning come from and what gives it its authority? Is it merely providing a slightly more sensitive development of the notion of class interests? And does this really accommodate the claims and arguments of the different ethnic communities in Britain, or the anger of those oppressed by racial and gender prejudice? These 'voices' may argue that the pluralist socialist project of 'living together but differently' dominates them by failing to listen to their different ways of experiencing. It requires acceptance of a belief in the analyses propounded, in a particular interpretation of what 'living together' and 'difference' mean. The planning frameworks developed within this route thus cannot escape the critique of scientific rationalism. In other words, the pluralist socialist project is still founded on systematised rationality and scientific understanding of social structure in its conception of 'living together' and of 'difference.'

**Communicative Rationality**

It is here that Habermas' search for a reformulation of modernity's concept of reason offers a way forward. Habermas argues that, far from giving up on reason as an informing principle for contemporary societies, we should shift perspective from an individualised, subject–object conception of reason, to reasoning formed within inter-subjective communication. Such reasoning is required where 'living together but differently' in shared space and time drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to 'act in the world' to address our collective concerns. Habermas' communicative rationality has parallels within conceptions of practical reasoning, implying an expansion from the notion of reason as pure logic and scientific empiricism to encompass all the ways we come to understand and know things and to use that knowledge in acting. Habermas argues that without some conception of reasoning, we have no way out of fundamentalism and nihilism. For him, the notion of the self-conscious autonomous individual, refining his or her knowledge against principles of logic and science, can be replaced by a notion of reason as inter-subjective mutual understanding arrived at by particular people in particular times and places, i.e. historically situated. Both subject and object are constituted through this process. Knowledge claims, upon which action possibilities are proposed, are validated in this conception of reasoning through discursively establishing principles of validity, rather than through appeal to logic or science, although both may well be considered as possibilities within the communicative context.

In this way, knowledge for action, principles of action and ways of acting are actively constituted by the
members of an inter-communicating community, situated in the particularities of time and place. Further, the reasoning employed can escape from confines of rational-scientific principles to include varying systems of morality, and culturally-specific traditions of expressive aesthetic experience. 'Right' and 'good' actions are those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse differences in material conditions and wants, moral perspectives and expressive cultures and inclinations. We do not need recourse to common fundamental ideals, or principles of 'the good social organisation' to guide us. Planning, and its contents, in this conception, is a way of acting which we can choose, after debate.

Habermas' conception of communicative action has been criticised in the context of the present discussion on two grounds. Firstly, by holding on to reason, it retains the very source of modernity's domanitory potential. Secondly, Habermas would like to believe that consensual positions can be arrived at, whereas contemporary social relations reveal deep cleavages, of class, race, gender and culture, which can only be resolved through power struggle between conflicting forces. Habermas justifies his retention of reasoning as a legitimate guiding principle for collective affairs on the grounds that, where collective 'acting in the world' is our concern, we need to engage in argumentation and debate. We need a reasoning capacity for these purposes. We cannot just engage in aesthetic presentation or moral faith if at some point we are faced both with 'making sense together' and 'working out' how to act together. This does not mean that the language of morality or aesthetics is excluded from our reasoning. Habermas argues that our intersubjective practical reasoning draws on the store of knowledge and understandings of technique, morality and aesthetics. In this way, our collective reasoning is informed by, situated within, the various 'lifeworlds' from which we come to engage in our collective enterprises. Our inter-subjective arguments may involve 'telling stories', as well as 'doing analyses'. Thus the narrative mode should accompany and intersect with experiential expression and the analytical mode. But in the end, the purpose of our efforts is not these (doing analysis, telling stories, rhetoric), but doing something, i.e. 'acting in the world'. For this, we need to discuss what we could and should do, why and how. There is an interesting parallel here with Walzer's notion of principles of justice for different spheres of social activity. But does not this process of collective argumentation merely lead to a new and potentially domanitory consensus, as the agreement freely arrived at through argument in one period imposes itself on the different differentiations of the next? Habermas proposes to counteract this possibility through criteria to sustain a dynamic critique within the reasoning process. Claims should be assessed in terms of their comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy and truth. Forester has since developed these as heuristic questions for planners to use in critiquing themselves and others as they search for a progressive power-challenging planning. The mutual understandings and agreements reached for one purpose at one time are thus revisable as the flow of communicative action proceeds. Habermas himself would clearly like to see stable consensuses emerge, societies built around principles of mutual understanding. Several planning theorists have also proposed the development of a communicative 'metalanguage' or a 'meta-discourse' for planning discussion. Such an enterprise parallels the search noted above by the 'new left' in Britain for forms of a democratically pluralist participation. But a metalanguage, however full of internal principles of critique, unavoidably contains domanitory potential. It could all too easily settle into assumptions of understanding and agreement detached from those whose ways of being, knowing and valuing are supposed to be reflected in the agreement. To be liberating rather than dominating, inter-communicative reasoning for
the purposes of 'acting in the world' must accept that the 'differences' between which we must communicate are not just differences in economic and social position, or in specific wants and needs, but in systems of meaning. We see things differently because words, phrases, expressions, objects, are interpreted differently according to our frame of reference. It is this point, long understood in anthropology and emphasised in phenomenology, which underpins the strength of the relativist position. It is here that the present author would part company with Habermas, in order to recognise the inherent localised specificity and untranslatability of the systems of meaning. We may shift our ideas, learn from each other, adapt to each other, 'act in the world' together. Systems of meaning or frames of reference shift and evolve in response to such encounters. But it can never be possible to construct a stable consensus around 'how we see things', merely a temporary accommodation of different, and differently adapting, perceptions.

The critics of modernity argue that the system of meaning proposed by scientific rationalism has dominated and crowded out all other systems of meaning. If communicative action is to transcend this domanitory threat, its concern should rather be to develop understandings and practices of inter-discursive communication, of translation rather than superimposition. For, as Geertz argues, no one system of meaning can ever fully understand enough. It can merely search for ways of opening windows on what it means to see things differently.

Developed in this way, this direction is for a new form of planning through inter-discursive communication, a way of 'living together differently through struggling to make sense together'. Its openness, its exteriorising quality, its internal capacity, for critique should counteract any potential to turn mutual understanding arrived at one historical moment into a repressive cultural regime at the next. It offers the hope that 'progress', a 'project of becoming', is still possible. It is this direction which, in the present author's view, holds an important promise and challenge for planning, and, more generally, for democracy, as Forester argues.

**Planning as a communicative enterprise**

Environmental planning has been understood in this article as a process for collectively, and interactively, addressing and working out how to act, in respect of shared concerns about how far and how to 'manage' environmental change. Mannheim argued that scientific rationalism provided the central resource for this enterprise. The collapse of the uni-dimensional domination of scientific rationalism has now demolished this route to invention for planning. Apart from the vestigial endeavours of a politically dominant economics, any recourse to scientific knowledge or rational procedures must now be contained within some other conception of what makes for democratic 'acting in the world'. Habermas offers an alternative which retains the notion of the liberating and democratic potential of reasoning, but broadened to encompass not merely rational-technical forms of reasoning, but moral appreciation and aesthetic experience. This wider understanding of what we know, and how we know it, rooted as much in 'practical sense' as in formalised knowledge, is brought into collective 'deciding and acting' through inter-subjective communication rather than the self-reflective consciousness of autonomous individuals. The effort of constructing mutual understanding as the locus of reasoning activity replaces the subject-centred 'philosophy of consciousness', which, Habermas argues, has dominated Western conceptions of reason since the Enlightenment. Through it, the specificities of time and place, of culture, society and personality, of 'habitus' as Bourdieu puts it, are expressed, and constituted. For Habermas, a conscious inter-subjective understanding of collective communicative work is a force to sustain an internally critical democratic effort, resisting the potential domination of 'one-dimensional' principles, whether
scientific, moral or aesthetic.

What can planning mean in this context of post-rationalist, inter-communicative, reasoned, many-dimensional, ‘thinking about and acting’ in the world? What purposes and practices should it have?

A communicative approach to knowledge production - knowledge of conditions, of cause and effect, moral values and aesthetic worlds - maintains that knowledge is not pre-formulated but is specifically created anew in our communication through exchanging perceptions and understanding and through drawing on the stock of life experience and previously consolidated cultural and moral knowledge available to participants. We cannot, therefore, predefine a set of tasks which planning must address, since these must be specifically discovered, learnt about and understood through inter-communicative processes.

Nevertheless, ongoing processes of debate about environmental matters have created a thought-world, a contemporary 'common sense' within which, however fluid and in need of critique it may be, the elements of a substantive agenda are evident. The contemporary rediscovery of environmental planning is fuelled by a widespread and inter-discursive concern with managing economic development, enriching our cultural life, avoiding polarising and segregating tendencies in life styles and life opportunities, and undertaking all these within an attitude to the natural environment which is both respecting and sustaining of long-term ecological balances. The general purposes of environmental planning situated in this context are to balance these connecting but often contradictory aims. But what constitutes the ‘balance’ in particular times and places cannot be known in advance. ‘Standardised’ approaches to ‘balancing’, which have a long history in planning thought and practice, encapsulated in substantive ‘blueprint’ plans, merely ‘dominate’ the situations they land upon.

This shifts attention from the substantive purposes of environmental planning to the practices by which purposes are established, actions identified and followed through. What does a communicative rationality suggest as appropriate when addressing environmental management issues in contemporary Western democracies, and how could their conversion into a ‘process’ blueprint be avoided?

The outlines of appropriate practices for an inter-communicative planning are beginning to emerge through the work of a range of planning theorists during the 1980s. This work has been influenced not only by Habermas, but by other and often conflicting contributors to the post-modern and anti-rationalist debate, notably Foucault and Bourdieu, and by an increasing number of ‘ethnographic’ studies of planning practice. An attempt is made to summarise this ‘new’ planning direction through ten propositions.

1. Planning is an interactive and interpretive process, focusing ‘deciding and acting’ within a range of specialised allocative and authoritative systems, but drawing on the multi-dimensionality of ‘lifeworlds’ or ‘practical sense’, rather than a single formalised dimension (for example, urban morphology or scientific rationalism).

Formal techniques of analysis and design in planning processes are but one form of discourse. Planning processes should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience, using a range of presentational forms, from ‘telling stories’ to aesthetic illustrations of experiences. Statistical analysis coexists in such processes with poems and moral fables. A prototype example here might be some of the new initiatives in Britain in working to help tenants and residents improve the quality of their living environment.

2. Such interaction assumes the pre-existence of individuals engaged with others in diverse, fluid and overlapping ‘discourse communities’, each with its own meaning systems, and hence knowledge forms and ways of reasoning.
and valuing. Such communities may be nearer or further from each other in relation to access to each other’s languages, but no common language or fully common understanding can be arrived at. Communicative action thus focuses on searching for achievable levels of mutual understanding for the purposes in hand, while retaining awareness of that which is not understood (i.e. we may not understand why someone says ‘no’, but we should recognise the negation as valid; that we know there is a reason but it cannot [yet] be understood by us).46

3. Such interaction involves respectful discussion within and between discursive communities, respect implying recognising, valuing, listening and searching for translative possibilities between different discourse communities.47

A prototype example here might be the public participation exercise undertaken an Sheffield City Centre’s Local Plan.48

4. It involves invention not only through programmes of action, but in the construction of the arenas within which these programmes are formulated and conflicts identified and mediated. Such a planning thus needs to be reflective about its own processes.49 The Sheffield City Centre Local Plan exercise is one example among several in Britain which illustrate this sensitive attention to arenas within which planning work gets done.50 Within the argumentation of these communicative processes, all dimensions of knowing, understanding, appreciating, experiencing and judging may be brought into play. The struggle of engaging in interdiscursive communicative action is to grasp these and find ways of reasoning among the competing claims for action they generate, without dismissing or devaluing any one until it has been explored. Nothing is ‘inadmissible’ except the claim that some things are ‘off agenda’ and cannot be discussed. All claims merit the reply: ‘We acknowledge you feel this is of value. Can you help us understand why? Can we work out how it affects what we thought we were trying to do? Are there any reasons why the claim cannot receive collective support?’

6. A reflexive and critical capacity should be kept alive in the processes of argumentation, using the Habermasian claims of comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy and truth. But the critical intent should not be directed at the discourses of the different participative communities (not: ‘we are right and you are wrong’; ‘we are good and you are bad’), but at the discourse around specific actions being invented through the communicative process (e.g. ‘watch out: this metaphor we are using blocks out the ideas our other colleagues are proposing’, or ‘this line of thinking will be dismissed as illegitimate by central government. Do we really think it is illegitimate? Are we really going to challenge their power? OK, so how?’)51

A sensitive illustration of this was the discussion around developing the women’s agenda for the Greater London Development Plan as described by Allen.52

7. This inbuilt critique, a morality for interaction, serves the project of democratic pluralism by according ‘voice’, ‘ear’ and ‘respect’ to all those with an interest in the issues at stake. This is no easy matter, as interests overlap and conflict, with the conflicts experienced within each one of us magnified in the inter-discursive arena. The important point is that the morality and the dilemmas are addressed inter-discursively, forming thereby both the processes and arenas of debate.

8. The literature on negotiation counsels us that apparently fixed preferences may be altered when individuals and groups are
encouraged to articulate their interests together. Interaction is thus not simply a form of exchange, or bargaining around pre-defined interests. It involves mutually reconstructing what constitute the interests of the various participants - a process of mutual learning through mutually searching to understand. It is not only innovative, but has the potential to change, to transform material conditions and established power relations through the continuous effort to 'critique' and 'demystify'; through increasing understanding among participants and hence highlighting oppressions and 'dominatory' forces; and through creating well-grounded arguments for alternative analyses and perceptions, through actively constructing new understandings. Ultimately, the transformative potential of communicative action lies in the power embodied in 'the better argument', in the power of ideas, metaphors, images, stories. This echoes Bourdieu's point that how we talk about things helps to bring them about. In this way, diverse people, with experience of different societal conditions and cultural communities, are encouraged to recognise each other's presence and negotiate their shared concerns. Through such processes of argumentation, we may come to agree, or accept a process of agreeing, on what should be done, without necessarily arriving at a unified view of our respective lifeworlds. The critical criteria built into such a process of argument encourages openness and 'transparency', but without simplification. If collective concerns are ambivalent and ambiguous, such a communicative process should allow acknowledgement that this is so, perhaps unavoidably so. So the dilemmas and creative potentials of ambiguity enrich the inter-discursive effort, rather than being washed out in the attempt to construct a one-dimensional language.

10. The purpose of such an inter-communicative planning is to help to 'start out' and 'go along' in mutually agreeable ways based on an effort at interdiscursive understanding, drawing on, critiquing and reconstructing the understandings we bring to discussion. The inbuilt criteria of critique, if kept alive, should prevent such 'starting agreements' and 'travelling pacts' consolidating into a unified code and language which could then limit our further capacities at invention. We may be able to agree on what to do next, on how to 'start out', and 'travel along' for a while. We cannot know where this will take us. But we can act with hope and ambition to achieve future possibilities. Neither the 'comprehensive plan' nor 'goal-directed' programmes have more than a temporary existence in such a conception of communicative and potentially transformative environmental planning.

Systems and practices for environmental planning
How can this conception of communicative practices for constructing and critiquing understanding among diverse discursive communities assist in the development of 'systems' for environmental planning, of local realisations of these, and of the specific contents of local planning systems? The very concept of a 'system' immediately conjures up notions of dominatory practices which impose themselves on our actions. Yet with respect to our mutual environmental concerns, a key purpose of communicative action is to work out what 'rules' or 'codes of conduct' we can agree we need, to allow us to 'live together but differently' in shared environments. Planning systems consist of formal rules to guide the conduct, the resource allocation and management
activities of individuals and businesses. But they are more than a set of rules. The rules derive from conceptions of situations (contexts), problems experienced in these situations, ways of addressing these problems and of changing situations. It is where planning effort is deliberately focused on changing situations that we can speak of a planning with transformative intent.\textsuperscript{59}

‘Urban design’ or ‘physical blueprint’ approaches to environmental planning focused on ‘transforming towns’. Ideas of urban existence were consolidated into principles of urban structure and form, and from these to rules to govern proposals for development projects. Debates were confined to principles of urban form, conducted primarily within a narrow expert group (architects, engineers) legitimated by paternalist notions of ‘planning for people’. It was supported by a narrow architectural engineering discourse about the relative merits of different urban forms, drawing on aesthetic and moral principles. The ‘dominatory’ consequences of this for our towns and cities are notorious. This was essentially a continuation of a pre-enlightenment tradition of city planning carried forward into the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrialisation and urbanisation.

The Mannheimian conception of planning as the ‘rational mastery of the irrational’\textsuperscript{60} provided a more appropriate realisation of a ‘modern’ conception of planning. Translated through the Chicago school, this became the rational comprehensive process model of planning which has since been so influential in planning practice. This focused on the processes through which goals were formulated and strategies for achieving them devised. Here, rule generation operates on two levels – the methodological rules for arriving at a plan or programme, and the criteria necessary for realising that programme. Both were designed to be recursive, with feedback loops via monitoring procedures intended to sustain an internal critique of planning principles. Planning effort was focused on comprehensive understanding of urban and environmental systems and the ‘invention’ of sets of objectives and guidance principles for the comprehensive management of these systems. Rules to govern change in systems were expressed as performance criteria, linked back to objectives. The vocabulary of this approach is still influential in plan-making practice in Britain, in the way strategy is identified and expressed and rules for development control articulated. In this rationalist conception, citizens contribute to the process, but only by ‘feeding in’ their rationalised goals, rather than debating the understandings through which they come to have their goals. The concerns of politicians and citizens are in effect ‘translated’, ‘converted’ into the technical scientific language of policy analysts and urban and regional science. The metaphors of this language focused around images of process forms, of strategy and programmatic action. The domimatory potential of the rational procedural model lies in the claims to ‘comprehensiveness’ of what was primarily a narrow, economistic and functionalist conception of the dimensions of lifeworlds. The critical capacity of the monitoring feedback loops merely shifted priorities within the discourse. It did not provide a mechanism for critiquing the discourse itself.

Pluralist conceptions of interest mediation, of the kind first proposed by Davidoff,\textsuperscript{61} but later widely developed, seemed to reflect more clearly the reality of environmental planning politics. The practice of environmental planning has been described by many in Britain, including the present author, as one within which environmental perceptions and interests were asserted and mediated.\textsuperscript{62} The strategies, rules and the way rules were used were the product of bargaining processes among conflicting interests. But, as Forester argues, this treats each interest as a source of power, bargaining with others to create a calculus which expresses the power relations among the participants. Its language is that of prevalent political power games. It is not underpinned by any effort at ‘learning about’
the interests and perceptions of the participants and with that knowledge, revising what each participant thinks about each other's and their own interests. Only if this could happen could a creative inventive form of environmental planning develop, rather than merely a power-brokering planning.\textsuperscript{63}

The focus of an inter-subjective communicative argumentation is exactly at this point. It starts by recognising the potential diversity of ways in which concerned citizens (citizens with an 'interest' in issues) come to be concerned. Citizens may share a concern, but arrive at these through different cultural, societal and personal experiences. 'Understanding each other must therefore be accepted as a challenging task which is unlikely to be more than partially achieved. The language of interdiscursive communication, as already discussed, uses multiple modes, moving between analysis, moral fables and 'poems'.

The struggle within such inter-discursive communication is to maintain a capacity for critique. This requires the development of a critical, interactively reflexive habit. Of course, the dynamics of the ongoing flow of relations means that people cannot pause to reflect collectively at every instant. What it means is that 'taking breath' and 'sorting things out' should become a normal part of the practical endeavour of planning work. The Habermasian criteria help here, but reflection is also required as to the arenas of the communicative effort itself. Are there other concerned people who should be involved? Are there other ways of understanding these issues, discursive practices, which we should include? How should the position we have reached be expressed to maximise its relevance to all of us, allowing us to 'move on' but yet minimise the potential that what we have agreed will live an beyond our need for it and come to dominate us?\textsuperscript{64} Through these processes of active discursive critique, ideas for action may be invented, and necessary codes of conduct for the collective management of shared concerns be identified and agreed upon.

This conception of a planning 'invented' through reflective processes of intersubjective communication within which are absorbed internal criteria of critique, is suggestive of ways in which existing processes of plan-making, conflict resolution and implementation programmes might be transformed. Specifically, the active presence of a planning in this form will be reflected in the language and metaphor used within the various arenas constituted for environmental planning work. It would reflect efforts at honesty and openness, without losing a recognition of the layers and range of meanings present among those concerned with the issue in hand. It would acknowledge with respect the limited scope for mutual understanding between diverse discourse communities, while struggling to enlarge that understanding. It would accept other limits - to power, to empirical knowledge, to the resolvability of moral dilemmas - but seek to enable the world-of-action to 'start out' or 'move on' towards something better, without having to specify precisely a goal. Rather than Lindblomian marginal adjustments to the present,\textsuperscript{65} its language would be future seeking, but not, like its physical blueprint' and 'goaldirected' predecessors, future defining. Its images and metaphors would draw on both the experiential and abstract knowledge and understanding of those involved, recognising the interweaving of rational-technical, moral and aesthetic dimensions in our lives. it would seek to 'reason between' conflicting claims and conflicting ways of validating claims. It would not force one dimension of knowledge to dominate over another. It would be courageous, challenging power relations through critique and the presentation of alternative arguments. It would reflect the internal critical monitoring practices of participants. It is thus by the tone of its practices that it would be identified.

**The dialectics of a new planning**

To those seeking specific substantive solutions to particular problems, the planning outlined here may
seem too leisurely. With environmental disasters near at hand, can we afford to take the time to invent answers? To those seeking knowledgeable actions, this planning may seem too unfocused and diffuse. What happens if mystical perceptions or aesthetic reification crowd out the useful empirical and theoretical knowledge we have about cause and effect? To those conscious of the scale of inequalities in power relations, it may seem idealistic and innocent. Does it not merely cocoon us into a naive belief in the power of democratic discussions, while the forces of global capitalism ever more cleverly conceal the ways they oppress us?

To these doubts there are two replies. One is that to engage in any other strategy is to generate once again forms of planning which have inherent within them an anti-democratic ‘dominatory’ potential. Each is one-dimensional, drawing on the power of design, of moral imperative, of scientific reasoning or, unmasked, as a direct power struggle, drawing on the possibility of replacing one dominant power source with another. The second is that the practices involved are not so far from our experience. Prefigurative examples can be found in Britain in some of the work of the ‘new left’ for example, in the Greater London Council (GLC), particularly in dealing with women’s issues; and recently in a few of the new efforts in planmaking in Britain resulting from requirements to prepare Urban Development Plans and District Development Plans. More generally, some branches of the environmental and feminist movements have been moving in this direction. Further prefigurative potentials can even be recognised in contemporary management theory’s emphasis on group culture formation and empowerment, rather than management through hierarchical authoritarian structures. At a broader level, the ‘struggle for democracy’ in Eastern Europe and China has highlighted awareness in Western societies as to what democracy might mean. It is in Britain perhaps that this awareness has most progressive potential, since a critical eye finds so few guarantees of democracy in our political and legal systems.

‘Inventing democracy’ is thus, for British people, an issue which is moving increasingly sharply into focus. It is a time, as noted at the start of this article, for the invention of democratic processes. The field of environmental concerns is one of the critical arenas within which such invention is being demanded and tested. However, there are many democracies which might be invented. Learning and listening, respectful argumentation, are not enough. We need to develop skills in translation, in constructive critique, in collective invention and respectful action to be able, to realise the potential of a planning understood as collectively and intersubjectively addressing and working out how to act in respect of common concerns about urban and regional environments. We need to re-work the store of techniques and practices evolved within the planning field to identify their potential within a new communicative, dialogue-based, form of planning. This article has drawn on the work of a number of planning academics searching within the ‘lifeworld’ of planning practice for a better understanding of these skills. What is being invented, in planning practice and planning theory, is a new form of planning, a respectful argumentative form, of planning through debate, appropriate to our recognition of the failure of modernity’s conception of ‘pure reason’, yet searching, as Habermas does, for a continuation of the Enlightenment project of democratic progress through reasoned inter-subjective argument among free citizens. Yet, as the planning community explores the hopefulness of this new approach, it is important to remember the experience of past efforts at ‘democratic making’. Habermas offers the theory of communicative action as an inter-subjective project of emancipation from fundamentalism, totalitarianism and nihilism through deliberate efforts in mutual understanding through argument. But this can only succeed for more than a historical moment so long as the processes of internal critique are kept constantly alive; if what
Habermas calls 'the lifeworld' is constantly brought into the collective thinking about 'acting in the world' in respect of common affairs; and if the communicative effort of mutual understanding is sustained as a critical as well as a creative process. Either we succeed in keeping a critical dialectics alive within communicative action, or we remain caught within the dialectics of totalising systems. As the opposition of 'capitalism' versus 'communism' collapses, perhaps there is a hope that, through dynamically critical communicative processes, the democratic project of 'making sense together while living differently' can develop as a progressive force.

**Notes and References**

1 Debate is used here in preference to 'argumentation' as a more collaborative and positive word. Others see 'debate' as involving opposition between two sides. It will become clear that this is not what I associate with the word.

2 This article is a very substantial development of ideas initially sketched in Healey, P., 'Planning through Debate' (Paper given to Planning Theory Conference, Oxford, April 1990). A shorter version will appear in Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Durham, NC, Duke University Press. My thanks to my sister Bridget who allowed me to write this and read Habermas while on holiday. My thanks to Huw Thomas, John Forester, Seymour Mandelbaum, Jean Hillier, Jack Ellerby, Michael Benfield, Beth Moore Milroy, Gavin Kitching, Judith Allen, Michael Synnott and Nilton Torres, for their critical attention to an earlier draft.

3 See, for example, Rustin, M., For a Pluralist Socialism, London, Verso, 1985.


6 This is evident particularly in discussions on locality, place and local economic development. See, for example, Cooke, P. N., Back to the Future, London, Unwin Hyman, 1990; Massey, D., 'The Political Place of Locality Studies', Environment and Planning A, 23 (2) 1991, pp. 267-81.

7 See Forester, J., Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1989; Throgmorton, J., 'Planning and Analysis as Persuasive Storytelling: The Case of Electric Power Rate-making in the Chicago Area' (paper presented to the ACSP Congress, Austin, Texas, November 1990.

8 'Democracy' is, of course, used in contemporary debate in a wide and confused range of meanings (Williams, R., Keywords (2nd edn), London, Fontana, 1988). By a 'progressive meaning', I align myself with the position adopted by British authors such as Held, D., Models of Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, 1987, who argue for a notion of democracy based on the principle of autonomy in both political and economic spheres, in a system which promotes 'discussion, debate and competition among many divergent views' (p. 280). Within this conception, open debate, access to power centres, and general political participation are key requirements for democratic public life (p. 284). It is principles such as these which have helped to fuel the Charter 88 constitutional movement in Britain.


14 This position was most forcefully articulated in Castells, M., The


16 See Note 9 above.


22 See the discussion of Nietzsche's Dionysian Search and Heidigger's justification of Nazism in Habermas, J., op. cit., N15, and Moore Milroy's discussion of the fundamentalism in some 'postmodern' thought (Moore Milroy, op. cit., N5).


37 See Geertz, C., op. cit., N36.


40 See Bourdieu, P., op. cit., N36.


46 This goes beyond Habermas' argument into the ideas offered by 'ethnographic' scholars such as Bourdieu and Geertz.

47 The emphasis on respect is powerfully expressed in John Forester's work. Geertz (op. cit., N36) highlights the challenge of translation.


50 The importance of this listening and learning attitude is emphasised in Forester, J., op. cit., N7. See also Throgmorton, J., op. cit., N35, and Healey, P., op. cit., N44.


53 I am indebted to Seymour Mandelbaum for the phrasing of this sentence.

54 See Forester, J., op. cit., N38.

55 As Habermas, J., op. cit., N15, claims.

56 Bourdieu, P., op. cit., N36 is referring to Marx's idea of class.

57 See Forester's discussion of Nussbaum's work (Forester, J., op. cit., N31).

58 I am indebted to correspondence about the qualities of a democratic plan with John Forester for my thinking here, as well as the ideas of Sennett, R., op. cit., N23, on designing with the grain of diversity.

59 Following the usage of Friedmann, J., op. cit., N 15, 'transformative' here refers to changing the context deliberately as well as acting within the context.

60 Mannheim, K. op. cit., N11


64 I have developed ideas on the constitution of process forms in Healey, P., 'Policy Processes in Planning', Policy and Politics 18 (1) 1990, pp. 91103.


69 Grove White, R., op. cit., N21 makes this point very cogently.
Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice
Judith Innes


Closing the Theory–Practice Gap
The long-bemoaned gap between theory and practice in planning is closing¹ as a new type of planning theorist is beginning to dominate the field. These theorists make the gap complaint moot because they take practice as the raw material of their inquiry. In this they differ from their predecessors, who did primarily armchair theorizing and systematic thinking about planning. These new theorists pursue the questions and puzzles that arise in their study of practice, rather than those which emerge from thinking about how planning could or should be. These new planning scholars do grounded theorizing based on richly interpretive study of practice. Their purpose is, on the one hand, to document what planners do and, on the other, to reflect critically on that practice. They apply intellectual lenses that are new to planning to illuminate and critique what they see. They see planning as an interactive, communicative activity and depict planners as deeply embedded in the fabric of community, politics, and public decision-making. Their work has gained the attention of both planning academics and practicing planners because it is accessible and interesting. It does not have bottom-line prescriptions or simple models for how to proceed, but it has helped students and academics to see planning, and has helped planners to see themselves.

An Emerging Paradigm for Planning Theory
It is my contention that the new developments in planning theory amount to the construction of a paradigm, rather than simply an incremental adaptation of familiar methods and concepts. A paradigm can be regarded as the assumptions and practices of thought and research that a group of people share among themselves (Kuhn 1970). To be thought of as sharing a paradigm, scholars have to refer to each other, use each other’s work, and address each other’s puzzles. For a body of work to be viewed as representing a new paradigm rather than an extension of an older one, it would use little of the concepts or methods of the older
one. The new one begins to frame the work of most of those in the field. The communicative action theorists refer to a different set of intellectual mentors and literatures than do the systematic thinkers. They cross-reference each other and build on each other’s work (e.g., Forester 1989; Healey 1992), while referring only infrequently to the work of the systematic thinkers. They address different subjects and questions for different purposes, and they use different methods of inquiry and standards of evidence than do the systematic thinkers. Some of those who began in the systematic thinking approach are now producing work that uses the concepts of these communicative action theorists (Faludi 1992). Like any new paradigm, the communicative action approach is attractive because it answers questions unanswerable in earlier thought. At the same time, however, it raises new questions that it cannot answer and sets the scene for the next generation of inquirers.

If we are witnessing the birth of a planning theory paradigm, then it is right on schedule. There are probably 1,500 people today who hold a planning Ph.D.2 The proportion of educators with a Ph.D. in planning is steadily increasing. Not surprisingly it is from these educators that the new theorists come. They come armed with the tools of social science research and driven by a need to understand the enterprise they have chosen for their career – to be intellectuals who can educate professionals for practical work in the real world. They have the luxury, far less available to an earlier generation of planning scholars, to speak to their peers at conferences and through the growing number of US and international planning journals. By contrast, the earlier generation of planning theorists had a reference group of people with degrees and academic appointments in other fields, who found the notion of planning practice to be of little intrinsic interest. The task that the earlier generation saw was to map the future terrain of planning. Now the task is to find out what that field has become and to point directions from there.

If a new paradigm is taking shape, coexisting with an earlier one (or with a set of ideas and practices that may never have been sufficiently coherent to be termed a paradigm), it is not surprising that educators cannot find coherence in the planning theory literature as a whole, nor agree on a common bibliography. While John Friedmann (1987) has helped all of us who write and teach planning theory with his remarkable history of planning thought and his categories for classifying planning theory, unless we recognize that a fundamental shift in the world view of planning theorists has occurred, we miss what is important and misclassify some of those theorists’ work. If we pay attention, however, to the emergent paradigm, we not only can make more sense of planning theory as a field, but we also discover sources of creativity and renewal.

**Systematic Thinking about Planning**

Thinking systematically about planning is a good way to describe the work of the predominant contributors to planning thought of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These theorists’ purpose was to make persuasive arguments for how planning is or ought to be. Their work may have been tacitly informed by their knowledge – or even direct experience – of planning, but it seldom reported first-hand research. These theorists include those in Friedmann’s categories of applied rationality and societal guidance, thinkers such as Etzioni (1968), Hirschman (1958, 1967), Lindblom (1959), Faludi (1973), and Rittel and Webber (1973).

Throughout most of this work runs the tacit assumption that planners’ purposes are to maximize welfare and solve problems. Planners do this through analysis that influences decisions, through the design of regulations and implementation strategies that will produce the desired outcomes, and by enabling or creating institutions like markets or voting rules that allow self-organizing systems to do the job. The planner is ideally and appropriately a rational man operating at
arm’s length from the messy world of politics. These theorists, for the most part, share a faith in instrumental rationality; they share the ideas that technology and knowledge can make the world work better and that planning can be an important tool for social progress. The intellectual forebears of this group are embedded in positivist epistemology and their work is on policy analysis, administrative behavior (Simon 1945), public choice theory (e.g., Olson 1965; Buchanan and Tullock 1962), neoclassical market theory (Friedman 1974), systems theory and systems analysis (Churchman 1968); incrementalism (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963; Hirschman 1967), and others, spanning a wide range of disciplines and fields. The systematic thinkers came up against the dilemmas inherent in instrumental rationality. Rittel and Webber (1973), for example, pointed out “wicked problems” which could not be solved because the problem definition kept shifting and there was no way to aggregate incommensurable values. The unsolvable puzzles were many, including the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), the prisoner’s dilemma (Rapaport and Chammah 1965), the failure of collective action (Olson 1965), the limitations of cost-benefit analysis and other systematic analytic methods (Rivlin 1971), the indeterminacy of the implementation process (Bardach 1977; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), the inevitability of uncertainty in goals and technology for planning problems (Christensen 1985), the impossibility of aggregating the public interest so that its optimization can be amenable to rational systematic analysis (Altshuler 1965), and the impossibility of relying on the large-scale model for societal guidance (Lee 1973).

Planning as Communicative Action
The communicative action theorists find out what planning is by finding out what planners do, rather than postulating what planning ought to be. They do not talk about an abstract planner, but about specific ones. They pay attention to the messy part of planning that does not fit into a systematic framework. They build on the most fundamental of findings from their study of practice - that planning is more than anything an interactive, communicative activity. Systematic analysis and logical argumentation are but a tiny part of what this planner does. Communicative action theorists see planners as actors in the world rather than as observers or neutral experts. They not only do not premise their work on the idea that the planner’s task is to use knowledge for managing society, many of them are worried about the planner’s potential to exercise such power.

For ideas and inspiration, these theorists turn to a different array of social scientists and philosophers than do the systematic thinkers. They rely more on qualitative, interpretive inquiry than on logical deductive analysis, and they seek to understand the unique and the contextual, rather than make general propositions. These theorists tell stories and look for insights, rather than try to impose order and definition (Mandelbaum 1991). This planning theory has a lot of loose ends - so many that other theorists may not recognize it as theory at all. The communicative action theorists are diverse, delving into many questions of practice and using a variety of intellectual lenses. The groups include many of the theorists Friedmann classifies as “behavioral approaches and communicative practice,” and “social learning.”

The closest approximation to an exemplar thus far for those who do this type of theorizing is John Forester’s (1989) Planning in The Face of Power. His fine-grained, detailed observational study of planners at work is framed and informed by ideas drawn from Habermas and Wittgenstein. It has been widely read and cited. Many others have brought important perspectives to bear on the study of practice. These include Allen (1994) (Habermas and Foucault); Baum (1983) (psychology); Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) (negotiation and consensus building), Throgmortion (1991) (discourse and rhetoric); Howe (1990, 1992, 1994) (ethics); Liggett
(1991) and Peattie (1987) (representation); Bryson (1988) and Bryson and Crosby (1992, 1993) (Giddens and the design of processes); Christensen (1985) (organizational theory and intergovernmental relations); Healey (1992) and Healey et al. (1988) (institutional analysis and discourse); Flyvbjerg (1992) (Aristotle and Foucault); and Innes (1990) and de Neufville (1975, 1987) (social construction of knowledge), among others. The intellectual mentors within planning whose writing and, most importantly, whose teaching helped most to set this direction for planning thought include John Friedmann, Jack Dyckman, Richard Bolan, Melvin Webber, Lloyd Rodwin, Donald Michael, and Donald Schon. These scholars did not necessarily study practice themselves, but they raised the questions that challenged the student theorist’s faith in the potential of systematic thinking as the answer. They personally taught many of the theorists of today. Some of them introduced social learning theory and the important work of the Frankfurt school of critical theorists into planning thought, along with its questioning of the assumptions of scientific thinking and its fears of instrumental rationality as a tool of control. Important social or political theorists outside of planning whose work has influenced the new planning theorists, include European theorists Heidegger, Foucault, Giddens, Wittgenstein and Habermas, and the American pragmatists Dewey and Pierce.4

The Study of Practice
While communicative action theorists are too varied and too much in an exploratory mode for me to summarize their work here, I will briefly describe my own intellectual odyssey as a way to illuminate some of the important insights and questions that emerge in the study of practice. My odyssey moves from an early faith in the power of instrumental rationality through intensive qualitative studies of practice to a search for a new way to understand and improve planning. It led me to a fundamentally different perspective on planning and to the idea that the planning theorist’s goal should be to help planners develop a new type of critical, reflective practice which is both ethical and creative. The question of how to link knowledge and action led me into planning in 1965. I had been working for a congressman as a legislative assistant. It was my job to advise this man of few strong opinions and a safe seat. I had at my fingertips the information resources of the nation - lobbyists who provided data, professors who advised us on the latest research, and the Library of Congress, whose staff wrote a book for us when they could find nothing already written. I gathered and organized information and gave it to the congressman with my recommendation. He routinely thanked me and retired to his office to call a friend, whose advice he would take. I was frustrated. How could it be that with so much information, much of which was developed for public decision-making, I could not use it to influence the congressman? Was it his fault for being too political or too uninterested in the facts? Was it the fault of the information for not being well enough focused? Was it my fault for not knowing how to present it? Or was it something else?

In my planning studies at MIT my goal was to find out how and under what circumstances information affects decisions. The dissertation was my first venture into the study of practice. I looked historically at examples of success and failure in efforts to make indicators influential in policy making (de Neufville 1975). This research allowed me to see that many factors simultaneously came into play when an indicator became significant in policy making. I began to see that the answers to my question came in the form of stories. A different story was involved in each case, but patterns could be seen.

The most important overall conclusion was that Information that influences is Information that is socially constructed in the community where it is used.5 To the extent that the users of the indicators had negotiated and agreed on their definitions,
they paid attention to what the indicators showed once they were applied. This idea had far-reaching implications. Knowledge was linked directly to action without the intervening step of decision. Action often simply occurred once there was an agreement on the indicator and a shared understanding of the problem it reflected. Learning, deciding, and acting could not be distinguished. The linear, stepwise process, assumed by the model of instrumental rationality, where policymakers set goals and ask questions, and experts and planners answer them, simply did not apply (Innes 1990).

In other research, I found that technical information influenced action, but not by solving problems or providing the bottom line for a decision. Instead, it was the organizational routines and practices required to produce, analyze, present, and discuss such information that were important. Information became embedded in political agendas, and organizational attention focused on the issues it represented. The requirement for development and use of specific kinds of information altered who was empowered and legitimate to speak and which interests were represented. The result was to change the terms of public discourse and the taken-for-granted norms of collective action (Innes 1988). These conclusions helped me to see how information could become influential, but they raised difficult methodological and ethical questions for a profession which purports to serve through expertise and trained judgment. A profession's legitimacy rests on its knowledge. The study of practice shows that what ordinary people know is at least as relevant as what is found through systematic professional inquiry, but we have no professional standards to evaluate what ordinary people know. Moreover, much of the important knowledge includes stories, myths, and the implicit understandings shared in a community (de Neufville and Barton 1987; Mandelbaum 1991). Indeed, the connection to such narratives is what makes the difference between information that is used and information that is not.

Social processes turn information into meaningful knowledge and knowledge into action. As a profession, however, we know little about developing or carrying out such processes. If professionals actually create such processes instead of following the rules of scientific inquiry, they have far more power and discretion than is legitimate, according to the norms that govern public choice. If knowledge that makes a difference is constructed through a process in which a planner is not only a player, but a guide and manager, initiating and framing questions and directing attention, then ethical principles for this planner become even more essential. We cannot assume that if consensus was reached, it represents truth. Participation in a common education and culture gives us common assumptions and blinds us to what might be obvious to others. No principle allows planners to discriminate between a fair and informed process leading to some acceptable "truth" and a self-fulfilling process that produces misleading or distorted information and unjustified conclusions.

Most serious of all, knowledge that is generated and validated through social processes involving its users becomes embedded in the taken-for-granted assumptions and practices of these users. It becomes institutionalized and it is no longer examined, evaluated, or criticized. Like the unemployment indicator in the US, which was designed based on understandings and problems emerging from the Great Depression, the knowledge can, over time, come to misrepresent the problem, but it can be virtually impossible to change (de Neufville 1975).

Studies of practice by other planning researchers have left us in quandaries similar to mine. Forester's (1989) planner has substantial discretion - power - to frame problems, inform, and call attention to one point or another and, in the process, to empower or disempower individuals. But how does, or should, this planner decide how to frame issues or what to call attention to? Howe and Kaufman (1979) found that planners divided
themselves into those who saw their role as technicians; those who saw themselves as political actors; and, the majority, who could not classify themselves either way, but felt strongly the competing pressures of both roles. The planners who wrote in Thomas and Healey's (1991) Dilemmas of Planning Practice are troubled by many of the same things that trouble US planners. They struggle to be ethical, but are beset by competing loyalties and mandates. As a group they are uncertain about what authority or knowledge gives them the legitimacy to act as they do. They are uneasy about the capacity of elected bodies to represent the public or to make morally acceptable, informed decisions. They are uncomfortable with the expert role for themselves, recognizing that they have their own biases and that expertise has its limits. They have strong beliefs about the kind of society that is desirable, but they do not know how to work toward this within their professional roles. 6

Communicative Action: Building the Intellectual Framework

My choice of the term communicative action to characterize this emerging paradigm reflects my view that Habermas' work, particularly his Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1984), is likely to provide the principal framework for the new planning theory. This work has already had significant influence on many planning theorists, because it confronts directly many of the concerns that emerge from a study of practice. In particular, it directly confronts their practical and ethical worries about professional knowledge. A few points should suggest why this work, along with the thinking of other Frankfurt School critical theorists, has such appeal.

First, critical theorists contend that the scientific method not only does not produce simple truth, it can conceal as much as it reveals. Science can be a tool for manipulation. Science and other ways of knowing are shaped and distorted by power in a society. While there may be a reality or truth out there, it is hidden under the socially constructed understandings, theories, and assumptions shared in a society. These, in turn, embody an existing set of power relationships. Socially constructed concepts can colonize the lifeworld, blinding us to the deeper reality of our own experience. While Habermas, unlike some other critical theorists, argues that there is a role for instrumental rationality and scientific method, and thus makes his work acceptable to professionals in many fields, he focuses his attention on the development of critical or emancipatory ways of knowing that are designed to get past the embedded power relations in a society. These ideas are attractive to planners because, rather than forcing them to try for a value-neutral, expert role in which they do not believe, they offer planners the possibility of an ethical stance within the world as they experience it. The principles for emancipatory knowing fit with the basic inclination of many planners. Habermas argues, as do most critical theorists and American pragmatists, that it is not only appropriate to be motivated by practical interest in political and social life, but also that such motivation leads to knowledge. To achieve such emancipatory knowledge, the planner must start by challenging assumptions because hidden within these are power relations. Such challenge comes naturally to planners because of their multidisciplinary education and sceptical view of expertise. Critical theorists go a step further by contending that the knower's responsibility is to oppose the status quo because doing so allows the revelation of what is hidden. While from a practical standpoint this is difficult for a professional, planners are reformers at heart. They find it encouraging to think that the reformer urge need not be at odds with professionalism.

The method of knowing, according to Habermas, involves several elements. One element is self-reflection, designed to identify one's own rationalizations and uncover what is hidden in the self. A second, crucial concept is that emancipatory knowing comes from
discourse or dialectic. Such discourse can illuminate the many sides of reality and, if designed properly, can uncover the rationalizations which reinforce power relations. A third way of knowing comes through praxis. That is, those who have long experience and know-how play a part in uncovering reified concepts and assumptions. This practical know-how is itself part of knowledge. Theory and practice intertwine in emancipatory knowing. Theory only makes sense through practice and vice versa. Finally, this method of critique can lead to action through a conversion experience.

These principles for emancipatory knowing are not only compatible with the ways planners actually go about generating knowledge and influencing action, they provide some broad guidance for their practice. For Forester’s planners, critical self-reflection is crucial, as is taking the part of the oppressed to assure they use their power in ethical ways. Planners, in many contexts where knowledge and values are in contention, have created innovative, stakeholder-based, consensus-building processes. Habermas (1984) spells out a process for learning and deciding that bears a close resemblance to such practices and which provides principles for managing these processes, such as assuring representation of all major points of view, equalizing information among group members, and creating conditions within the group so that the force of argument can be the deciding factor rather than an individual's power outside the group. This form of learning is termed communicative rationality by Habermas.

Several other rich literatures also offer the new planning theory important opportunities for insightful reflection on practice. As planning is a communicative activity, language, discourse, and representation have become crucial foci for theorists (e.g., Throgmorton 1991; Peattie 1987). Feminist theory, with its emphasis on empowerment and disempowerment and the ways these occur in the world, and its interest in language and in the uncovering of hidden assumptions also provides a rich set of ideas that address the questions raised in the study of practice (Sandercock and Forsyth 1990). Finally, on the question of how knowledge and power are linked, Foucault (1980 1983) has begun to provide powerful inspiration for planning research (Fischler 1993).

Further Directions for Research

The combination of the introduction of critical theory into planning thought with the growing corpus of research on practice has opened new problematics for inquiry, which have in turn led theorists into further literatures in search of answers. Several topics will, I believe, become central to the new planning theory. The first is institutional design. The critical practitioner cannot operate within the same institutions nor follow the same norms as those envisioned by an earlier generation. Stakeholder, consensus-building approaches run counter to government by bureaucracy and elected officials. Planners themselves have never fit easily into the latter context, finding themselves equally uncomfortable with the rigidity of bureaucracy and with politician’s adaptiveness to public opinion. Some of the new planning theorists have begun to give attention to the design of new institutional forms for the new planning. Bryson and Crosby (1992), Healey (1992), Bolan (1991), Innes (1992a), Innes et al. (1994), and Neumann (1993) are among the theorists who have begun this work. The work of Giddens (1984), Ostrom (1990), and Putnam (1993) are likely to become important inspirations for the institutional design for the new planning in the coming years.

A closely related emerging theme is ethics. Ethics and institutions are inseparable because norms and values are embedded in the practices of those institutions. If institutions change, so must the ethical principles, and vice versa. Widespread disillusionment with the paradigm of instrumental rationality in a profession opens ethical questions about the legitimacy
of professional knowledge. Acceptance of the professional as an interested participant and designer of communicative processes means that planning theory cannot ignore the question of which or whose values must be represented. These are not the limited professional ethics questions that have commonly been addressed in planning curricula, but much broader substantive and procedural ethics. Planning theorists are delving into important philosophical traditions to find those that fit with emerging planning institutions and practices. Harper and Stein (1992) provide an excellent overview of normative ethics for planning theorists, as does Howe (1990, 1992, 1994).

Teaching Planning Theory
Many of my own ideas about communicative rationality and its centrality to learning grew out of a teaching workshop I attended in 1985. The central message of this five-day workshop was that effective teaching requires the teacher to relinquish the authority role while assisting the students to take over their own learning processes. The teachers of this workshop demonstrated this idea by forcing us (often reluctantly) out of the roles of passive listeners into the roles of participants. Our attention flagged after 20 minutes or so of lecture. But when we had a task to do our interest picked up. We became engaged in lively discussion among ourselves, often as the workshop leader simply watched. We could try out our ideas on each other even if we were very uncertain about the subject (German was my biggest problem), and we would gradually reach a way of understanding that gave us some confidence. I will never forget the object lesson when, in a dry abstract lecture, a calculus professor first tried to teach us about derivatives. Most of us had long since forgotten calculus and were not even motivated to pay attention. At best, we could follow the logic but not the implications. When, however, he divided us into groups and gave us a sheet of paper with various curves and lines an it, asking us to tell which were tangent, we immediately engaged in intense discussion and even argument, which we finally resolved by asking him the question he wanted us to ask: what is the definition of a tangent? By then we wanted to know, and we recognized the complex possibilities that the definition would have to address. At this point he could continue his lecture with our attention and understanding.

This experience gave me the object lesson that learning by doing has far more power than simply learning by reading or listening and that social learning - learning as part of a group effort - has important advantages over the solitary investigation of the lonely researcher. It reinforced and gave deeper meaning to what I had learned in my research on planning practice about the importance of the processes of social construction of information in planning. It meshed well with the literature I had begun to explore on group processes, consensus building, and negotiation. I began to see what communicative rationality could mean. What more appropriate strategy then but to teach communicative rationality by enacting it in the classroom? My own planning theory course, “Knowledge and Action in Planning,” has involved primarily doctoral students over the past few years. Many of the materials were too difficult and inaccessible for any but the most motivated students. We explored texts, with students assigned to teach different portions of the seminar; we did role-playing exercises and tried to make the difficult epistemological writings into ideas meaningful to the students and to planning. Where they were available, we read case material and applications to planning.

In the last two or three years, however, the explosion of thoughtful research and reflections on the communicative aspects of planning practice has made the teaching of planning as communicative action a practical option for professional masters students. Suddenly the abstract philosophical ideas are embodied in real stories of real planners and real problems. My view is that planning theory should now be divided into two parts. We should be teaching, first, the history
of planning thought. This course can deal with all the important perspectives of the last 40 years, perhaps even going back further to incorporate the significant writers on urban form and space such as Howard, Mumford, Stein, Kent, and others so often invisible in planning curricula today. The advantage of this history rubric is that the professor is not required to explain the coherence or logic of relationships among readings in the course. The focus can be on the contexts, events, and understandings over time that framed the work of these varied thinkers. The course can be linked to a history of the profession and of the city. Its purpose can be to help planners not to reinvent the past, but to learn from it and to build on it.

A second course for masters students should focus on theories of planning practice. Much of this would involve recent work, though a few earlier writings such as Altsuler’s (1965) City Planning Process might be included. This course would be primarily about planning as communicative action, because the research on practice typically demonstrates that this is a good rubric for understanding practice. The objective of teaching planning theory to Masters students is, in my view, to help them become reflective, creative practitioners. The purpose is to give them tools or lenses through which they can see planning and understand how it works. It is to give them ethical guides for practice and frameworks to create the new processes and institutions that will be needed in the future. From this point of view, the new planning theory serves well as the organizing framework.

Such a planning theory course should be taught as a learn-by-doing-and-experiencing course. It should not only offer the students key readings and lectures on the issues, but also bring in reflective practitioners to speak with the students who are primed with questions about practice, ethics, and politics. It should include miniexercises in communicative practice for the students and assignments which expose them to real-world practice, such as following planners around for a day or interviewing them about their work and critically assessing what they hear.

In the effort to create better planning theory courses for Master students, we must not neglect the Ph.D. students, nor assume that the Masters level of education on planning theory is sufficient for them. They will still need to grapple with the difficult texts in philosophy and social theory and still need the capability and the motivation to search through the various literatures that can provide planning with effective ways of understanding and acting on the difficult challenges that continue to emerge. It is these students who will continue to advance our field and they must be prepared for the task.

Notes
1. This gap was discussed in a paper in this journal in 1983 by de Neufville, and the point has been made many times in the literature in the last decade.
2. Eight hundred people graduated with a Ph.D. in planning between 1978 and 1990 and I would estimate another 700 before and since (Innes 1992a).
3. See Bernstein (1971 and 1976) for useful overviews of positivism in social and political theory.
4. Dryzek (1987) provides an excellent review of the earlier modes of thought to show how they are inadequate for environmental planning. Then in Discursive Democracy (Dryzek 1990), he outlines a version of communicative action theory for policy making, relying heavily on Habermas and linking it to negotiation and mediation. See Innes (1995).
5. The most important book for me in making sense of what I had found was Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) careful exploration of how what we take as reality is formed through social processes which combine subjective and objective knowledge.
6. Much of this is adapted from Innes (1994).
8. See, for example, the collection by Fischer and Forester (1993) and Mandelbaum et al. (in press).
References
Planning Theory Revisited
John Friedmann

Abstract
After brief personal recollections of the origins of planning theory, I, the author pose the question of why, after five decades of active theorizing, it is still impossible for people engaged in writing planning theory to agree an a formal definition of their subject. Four possible answers are explored: the problem of defining planning as an object to be theorized; the impossibility of talking about planning disconnected from actual institutional and political contexts; the several modes of doing planning theory and the dilemma of choosing among them; and the difficulty of incorporating power relations into planning discourse. The paper concludes with a brief comment on three themes that should be made central to theorizing the production of the urban habitat, the rise of civil society, and the question of power.

I believe that I may have been among the small number of postgraduate students to sit in on the first ever seminar in planning theory. It was at the University of Chicago, and the year was 1948. Our instructor was Edward Banfield, later a professor of urban politics at Harvard, but at that time he was still working on his Ph.D.. Banfield was a protégé of Rexford Tugwell, who chaired the Interdisciplinary Program of Education and Research in Planning where I was studying. Tugwell was a believer in the collective wisdom of planners, and a sworn enemy of corporate power. He was also the first in my country to raise planning thought to the level of theory. Although his essays on the subject were published, they were not widely read (except by his students), and when Banfield put together his syllabus, Tugwell's writings did not figure importantly. The prominent names, as I recall them now, were Karl Mannheim, particularly his recently translated book, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, and Herbert Simon's Administrative Behaviour, which was destined to turn Public Administration into a policy science. Other names, familiar now from the post-war
debates about the role of government in the economy - this was still, after all, the Age of Keynes - included Friedrich von Hayek and Barbara Wooton. We also pondered John Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*. From the beginning, then, planning theory was being conceptualized as a bi-continental, Euro-American enterprise. And as such it has remained. But what I would like to stress is that this new subject, planning theory, really had to be cobbled together from elements which were originally intended for altogether different uses. Tugwell and Mannheim both shared a concern with the place of planning in society (where planning meant, for the first, a directive role for the state and, for the second, a democratic *via media* between fascism and communism). Neither was specifically writing with city planning in mind. Tugwell had come from a chair in institutional economics at Columbia University, via some years as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who, during his first term, counted him as a member of his ‘brain trust’, later as Chairman of the New York City Planning Commission (under Mayor La Guardia), and finally as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Mannheim, who wrote his first version of *Man and Society* in Holland as an emigré from Nazi Germany in 1935, was best known for his earlier work on the Sociology of Knowledge. Herbert Simon, who would eventually move on to other endeavours in organization theory and artificial intelligence, had come out of Public Administration. Both Hayek and Wooton were economists. And John Dewey was a philosopher and a major figure in American pragmatism, one of whose central ideas - learning by doing - was widely adopted by educators in the post-World War II era.

I myself was very excited by all of these ideas and how they might be brought together to serve the enterprise of ‘planning’. Banfield who, as some of you may know, eventually abandoned planning for the academic discipline of political science, having formed a rather bleak view of its practitioners and of humanity in general, decided that the most promising theory for planning would have to be based on Herbert Simon’s synoptic model of rational decision-making. For better or worse, this identification of planning with rationality served as planning theory’s template for years to come and continues to inform the writings, most prominently, of Andreas Faludi and Ernest Alexander.

We have travelled some distance since those tentative beginnings. In our day, planning theory has achieved a certain kind of legitimacy. My good friend Luigi Mazza, of the Milano Polytechnic, has started the first journal with the explicit title of *Planning Theory*, and virtually all American planning schools now offer one or more core subjects on the theme. There are also several collections of readings, such as the recently published *Explorations in Planning Theory* by Mandelbaum, Mazza and Burchell, and two eagerly awaited new publications from Leonie Sandercock, *Making the Invisible Visible: Multicultural Planning Histories and Toward Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities and Regions*, as well as Bent Flyvbjerg’s *Rationality and Power*, a story (finally told in English) of redevelopment planning in Aalborg. One might be justified to conclude from this evidence that planning theory has finally arrived and is likely to stay around indefinitely as a defining field of academic endeavour.

But things are never so simple. A couple of years ago I wrote a short article for the *Journal of Planning Education and Research* - one of our house journals back in the United States - on ‘Teaching Planning Theory’. My hope was to codify and constrain what, to me, appeared to be the virtually boundless field of planning theory as it had evolved. I identified five - today I would say six - discourses that seemed to me to cover perhaps 90% of the relevant writings: applied rationality; societal guidance; behavioural (positivist) approaches; communicative practice; social learning; and radical planning or emancipatory practice. The journal editors invited comments from a number of
distinguished academics, only to discover that no two of us could agree on the nature of the beast we wanted to theorize. None of those who wrote comments wanted to be 'fenced in' by any definition of planning discourse, however loose and encompassing. Definitions were somehow perceived as limiting their freedom to call theory whatever they wished it to mean. We did minimally agree that planning theory could serve as a code word among us, but the consensus stopped there. We were riding off on different horses, each galloping into the sunset in a different direction.

I do not want to overstate the unwillingness of our theory tribe to arrive at agreements. In particular, I want to acknowledge one currently very popular model in planning theory that is based an John Forester's work, which he has drawn, in turn, from Jürgen Habermas' high-flying theoretical writings on communicative action - another distinguished Euro-American collaboration. But this unhappy experience - my inability to get even a handful of my colleagues to acknowledge that we are engaged on a common project with a tradition and history of its own - led me to think about some of the reasons for this failure. And as I mused on this 50-year-old hobby of mine, which I call thinking about planning, I confess that I discovered a number of difficulties inherent in this undertaking. Let me mention four of them: the problem of defining planning as an object to be theorized; the impossibility of talking about planning disconnected from actual institutional and political contexts; the several modes of doing planning theory - normative, positive, critical, and paradigm-shifting - and the dilemma of choosing among them; and last but not least, the difficulty of incorporating power relations into planning discourse.

Before going into more detail on each of these, let me just say that it is never going to be easy to do theory inside a profession that prides itself on being grounded in practice. In the so-called disciplines, discourse is of course mostly about theory, and sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, psychologists and all those other '-ists' risk being ostracized from their respective clans should they be bold enough to seriously venture into policy applications. Social scientists live for theory! Ability to theorize establishes the pecking order in their disciplines. But it is not the case in practical professions such as planning, where theorists are generally looked upon askance and tend to write mainly for each other. What use are they and all that jargon-laden scribbling they do? I shall return to this question. For now, let me just say that the life of a planning theorist had best be dissembled, should she/he seek her/his practicing colleagues' admiration. But back to the four 'difficulties' that, I claim, we encounter whenever we engage in planning discourse.

To start with, what exactly do we talk about when we talk about planning? We use words like 'to plan' 'the planner', 'the planning process', but, quite apart from whether their definitions would be helpful in answering my question, these terms are actually confusing. What planners are engaged in planning (and, for the sake of argument, I shall suppose here that we are limiting ourselves to so-called city planners, or urbanists, itself already a choice with baneful consequences for theory)? Professionals with a tertiary degree in the field? Architects specializing in urban design? The city engineer? Housing experts? Public officials who occupy positions in municipal planning offices? And should we distinguish city planners proper from, say, transportation or environmental planners? Are social planners in or out? What about planners who are not engaged in drawing up any sort of plan (strategic or otherwise) but are engaged in the resolution of conflicts about urban issues of one kind or another? Do certain lawyers qualify, even though they have no planning degree? And what of city managers? There is no end to this sort of questioning, but whatever our answers are, they will make a significant difference to what and how we 'theorize'.

We also lose ourselves in another part of the labyrinth, whenever we ask a question about the 'planning
process'. Some of our schools actually teach subjects by that name. They teach what, in Australia, would be called 'statutory planning', that is, the formal procedures required by law for obtaining, for example, a zoning variance, and the legal appeals that are open to the petitioner in the case of a denial. But statutory planning is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to large planning decisions on freeway routing, docklands redevelopment schemes, major facility locations and similar 'mega'-projects that will have major impacts on the form and functioning of cities. Decisions on these larger matters are the life of politics; they may involve the national government and even international Financier institutions; at best, they bear only a formal resemblance to what is ordinarily called the planning process. They involve more than the public bureaucracy and their 'petitioners'. The real process is rather a tug of war that may extend over several decades and involve all sorts of people, not least from the concerned sectors of civil society.

Planning theorists have tried desperately to escape this labyrinth by abstracting from real-life situations. When I left the University of Chicago in 1955, the prevailing notion was that our profession was all about making 'rational decisions' in the mode of Herbert Simon, as interpreted and further reduced to a set of explicit rules by Edward Banfield. One either accepted this formulation or despised of it. Banfield and his colleague, Martin Meyerson, later President of the University of Pennsylvania, despised of rationality in human affairs and turned their back on planning. Others, like Andreas Faludi, continued to work within this framework, while modifying it to turn it into something other than the Weberian 'iron cage' that the original formulation had suggested. Outside of the planning field, decision-making remained the focus, but 'rationality' now acquired new meanings, such as 'incrementalism' (Charles Lindblom) or 'mixed scanning' (Amitai Etzioni). My own 'eureka' came one day in the late 1960s when I woke up one morning with the inspiration that planning could be modelled as the relationship between knowledge and action. That seemed to open up new avenues for research, much of which I summarized in two books, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning (1973) and Planning in the Public Domain (1987).

But, of course, no theoretical object remains forever unchallenged. Paradigms shift, as we know, either because their potentials are exhausted (they no longer pose interesting questions) or because other topics are in the ascendancy. John Forester, to whose continuing work I have already referred, focuses on dialogue and communicative processes. His particular interest is in mediation, and how a structured process of talking through conflicting positions can help the interested parties to move, step by step, to an agreement. Most recently, Leonie Sandercock has been promoting the idea of alternative planning histories, those told by oppressed and marginalized social groups engaged in city-building processes. Her work clearly de-professionalizes planning and shifts attention to political conflict. Her primary interest is not Forester's 'getting to yes' but social justice for those whose voices have been silenced. Her work opens up a vast field for research into planning that has barely been scratched.

The theoretical object of planning thus remains open and necessarily contested. This is the first of my four difficulties, which continue to make any agreement in planning theory nearly impossible. We are too busy disagreeing to build up and refine a single theory of planning.

The second difficulty is the illusion that planning theory is some sort of Platonic universal, inhabiting the realm of pure ideal that float across the earth, shining their benevolent light upon humanity. In this post-modern age - I do apologize for using this overexposed epithet - we are used to consigning all universal theories to the Inferno. But I mean something quite tangible and specific. Planning theories are not only embedded in Euro-American planning traditions, they also suggest
a way of thinking that is quite alien, to cite but one example, to Asian academic life. For instance, it would be virtually impossible for me to give this lecture to a knowing, appreciative audience in China or Japan. Asian audiences would perhaps expect to be informed about American (or Australian) planning practices, our own real-life experiences with planning, and about what works for us, and why. They would be shy on abstract musings about rationality, dialogue, the alternative histories of oppressed minorities and women, and the anguish we sometimes display about 'getting our values right'. They would rather learn about technical aspects of transportation planning, or how to organize land markets in countries that are still nominally socialist. I have no wish to single out Asian planners, of whom there are now large numbers, from Delhi to Beijing and beyond. Admittedly, some ideal do travel even if they are changed in the process. I would nevertheless maintain that my proposition generally holds true. Even the Euro-American collaboration on theory is, to some extent, an illusion. Take, for example, the role of the local state in the USA and in the Netherlands. Different political cultures produce very different kinds of planning. In my country, the Dutch planning system is much admired because it seems to have teeth in it and to be effective in controlling land uses and moving forward to a truly sustainable development. I rather suspect that I would hear far more critical voices about Dutch planning from Dutch planners here in Nijmegen. One is always more critical at home. Speaking as an American, I would say that official planning in my own country is largely a farce. What counts with us more is the politics of city-building, and that is not quite the same thing. I am not in a position to come to a judicious conclusion about the actual practices of either Dutch or American planning, but I can say this much: theorizing that will help to improve the practice of planning in Holland would have to be tailored to the traditions of that country, just as American planning theory reflects conditions on the other side of the Atlantic. Pace post-modernism, Euro-Americans still enjoy, or pretend to enjoy, abstract theorizing; it is a sort of intellectual game with us. But the pay-off comes only when we can limit our assertions to the contexts of particular socio-cultural and political traditions. The call is out for many planning theories, not one.

The third difficulty arises from the fact that we have very different expectations about the role of planning theory and considerable trouble in choosing among them. Some of us think of theory as primarily normative: how to improve the practice of planning. That was my intent when I wrote about a theory of transactive planning in the early 1970s; it is also John Forester’s explicit purpose. For others, theory has primarily explanatory, even predictive value. Case studies of planning - one might think here of Peter Hall’s provocatively titled Great Planning Disasters - tend to fall into this category. They may not be high-powered theory, but they are grist for the mill. A more recent example is a case study by Rebecca Abers of participatory municipal budgeting in the southern Brazilian capital of Porto Alegre. When her dissertation is published, it will be a contribution to the theory of popular participation in planning. Still another set of planning theorists, most of whom write from a political economy perspective, devote their time to deconstructing mainstream planning. Some of David Harvey’s and Manuel Castells’ earlier work, which was in a Marxist mode, or Christine Boyer’s Foucauldian Dreaming the Rational City, belong to this category. Finally, there are scholarly efforts aimed at changing our thinking about planning altogether, which is how I would describe Leonie Sandercock’s recent attempt to bring social planning into a broader accord with conditions prevailing in the contemporary city. The problem that arises is the difficulty we have in choosing among these several modes. To begin with, the categories I mentioned do not neatly delimit different modes of theorizing. What starts out as a descriptive account of planning, for example, soon turns into a
critique, and every critique already implies a preferred normative theory. Or theoretical writings that propose a shift in how we should look at planning frequently range across the entire spectrum of theory modes. To our colleagues in the social and human sciences, this seems a very odd approach to what they would describe as theory-building, and as a result, they pay little attention to what we do in our own backyard. On the other hand, wanting to confine ourselves abstemiously to only one mode of theorizing, keeping our distance from other possible modes, has a devastating effect on the significance of what we manage to say. Theoretical austerity is clearly not the way to go. But writing in the plenitude of passion, across the entire gamut of modes of theory, runs the danger of saying too much too soon. Perhaps the biggest problem we face in theorizing planning is our ambivalence about power. The rational planning paradigm studiously avoided talking about any form of power other than the power of mind. This was also Aaron Wildavsky's position in his well-known text, *Speaking Truth to Power*. The belief was that reason would prevail, and even when it failed, planners could always take the moral high ground. After all, were they not rational, and rationality was good? The knowledge/action paradigm did little better. It not only failed to acknowledge the knowledge/power relation that has come to be associated with the writings of Michel Foucault, it also had little to say an how new visions might be implemented, because implementation requires an acknowledgment of power as a central issue. Or consider the communicative action paradigm with its Panglossian view of the power of dialogue to bridge the gap between those who command substantial power and those who do not. Whenever planners have written about power it has been mostly in the sense of enabling the powerless to do things for themselves. Thus also Forester. The main literatures on power - whether of the state, money, or civil society - have thus been imported from outside our field. This situation has led to a great deal of conflict within the profession. Our more practical-minded colleagues have tended to dismiss planning theory precisely for its failure to countenance power. The quickest way to dismiss someone's earnest efforts is to label them idealistic or utopian. A recent example is an essay by Bent Flyvbjerg, provocatively entitled 'Empowering Civil Society: Habermas, Foucault, and the Question of Conflict', in which he launches a fierce attack on Habermasian idealists, such as John Forester. It is nevertheless to Flyvbjerg's credit that he has ventured forth on the long trek towards integrating discourses of power, from Machiavelli to Gramsci and Foucault, with the still-sanitized multiple discourses of planning theory. The recent work of Orin Yiftachel (Ben Gurion University) should also be acknowledged in this context.

So this is my long answer to the question of why we experience such difficulty in getting anyone to listen seriously to us when we talk planning theory. All the same, we will go an doing what we do. Is this a contradiction? Allow me to suggest why I believe that we'll probably continue to engage in this Quixotian enterprise. First, we will keep an writing planning theory, because it's fun ... at least, for some of us. Vladimir Nabokov loved to collect butterflies. We, who are not Nabokov, go hunting for exotic species of ideas, more specifically, ideas about the practice of what still goes by the name of planning. More importantly, as a practical activity in the world, planning is in constant need of rethinking, and I take it to be one of our tasks to assist in this enterprise. Third, the many skeptics notwithstanding, theory does help to improve practice. One of the extant myths among self-styled practical folk is that they have no need for theory. But, in fact, as Donald Schön has shown, practitioners constantly work with theoretical assumptions and it is the theorist's job to make these assumptions visible and thus to help practitioners reflect on them. Fourth, planning does not exist in an intellectual vacuum. There is a lively play of ideas 'out there', which needs to be translated in ways that are meaningful to planners both academic
and practical. The Mannheims, von Hayeks, Poppers, Deweys, Simons, Gramscis, Habermases, and Foucaults do not simply reveal themselves to planners; they require trustworthy and capable interpreters. At the same time, we would all be the losers, if all we ever did was talk to our kith and kin about the boring empirical details of our daily grind. Fifth, planning as practice needs to continuously reinvent itself, and this requires a knowledge of its history and a certain conceptual agility. Sixth, one of the ways to introduce students to what we do, and to socialize them into the mysteries of our field, is to give them a strong dose of theory and history along the way. Planning is indeed less and less about technical matters. One can always get a statistician to make yet another population forecast or an architect to design street furniture, and there are plenty of economists and engineers to run feasibility studies. But the critical appreciation and appropriation of ideas is a rare talent that is becoming increasingly important in a world hungry for chaos theory because chaos is what our senses perceive.

In the time remaining to me, I want to talk about some of the things I would do differently today than when I worked on the manuscript for Planning in the Public Domain in the early 1980s. Or to put it another way: in what ways have I moved beyond this text? I shall talk about three recently resurrected themes: the production of the urban habitat; the rise of civil society; and the inevitable question of power.

Trying to get an historical overview of how we in Europe and America have thought about the relation between knowledge and action, I deliberately abstracted from any specific applications of planning. Critics were quick to point this out to me as one of the book’s more significant failures. More recently, in an article on planning education which appeared last year in the Journal of Planning Education and Research, I took a very different turn. In view of what many of my colleagues, as they looked on market triumphalism, regarded as a crisis for planning, I was searching for a substantive domain that would secure professionals holding a planning degree a legitimate place among the more established professions, from architecture to law and engineering. What, I asked, was our unique competence as planners, the body of knowledge which no one else could legitimately claim as their own? If we were unable to identify such a domain, then, indeed, planning, as a field of professional study, was perhaps not worth saving. My provisional answer was that planners have or should have a grounding in knowledge about the socio-spatial processes that, in interaction with each other, produce the urban habitat.

Now, that the urban habitat is somehow produced is not an especially novel idea. Henri Lefebvre was the first to formulate a productivist view of the city, in language that, because of its Marxist tinge, made his writings popular with some geographers and urban sociologists, most notably Manuel Castells and Edward Soja. The concept itself is simple enough: along with other animals, we humans build the nests in which we live and work, and where we reproduce ourselves. However, and this is the key that opens the question to debate, we do not make our habitat as we would wish. The human, and more specifically, the urban habitat, takes form as multiple forces interact with each other in ways that are not fully predictable. In the article to which I referred, I mention six of them, calling them socio-spatial processes: briefly, urbanization, regional economic growth and change, city-building, cultural differentiation and change, the transformation of nature, and urban politics and empowerment. This is not the occasion to go into detail. Suffice it to say that, in their complex and dynamic inter-relationships, these six processes produce the multi-dimensional habitats we inherit.

In this context, one meaning of planning refers to the conscious intervention of collective actors - roughly speaking, state, capital and organized civil society - in the production of urban space, so that outcomes
may be turned to one or the other’s favour. It is, therefore, obvious that planners need to have a good understanding of how these city-forming processes work before we impose on them a normative structure or, what is currently more likely, mediate among the interests affected. This formulation posits the city-forming process first, before there can be any serious talk of strategic intervention. Please note my use of the military term of strategy; each collective actor will seek to influence outcomes in desired ways by pursuing different strategies against their real or imagined opponents. (But what is desired may actually change in the process, so that ‘goals’ are never completely given in advance, as used to be required by the decision model of the early 1950s).

Theorizing planning by incorporating city-forming processes into the planning paradigm, rather than talking about planning outside of any historical and spatial context, is thus one of the ways by which I would want to amend Planning in the Public Domain. And there are two additional ways, both of which I have already touched upon in this description of how the urban habitat is formed. The inclusion of civil society as one of three collective actors shaping our cities would not have been possible a mere generation ago. Although we often used terms like ‘community’ when we talked of local planning, the term was typically used in a passive, general sense. But over the last decade, spurred by civil protests in Latin America and Eastern Europe, there has been a revival of interest in the 18th century concept of a civil society. I cannot rehearse the rather extensive literature here. Suffice it to say, that civil society carries a heavy freight of political meaning in a world that seems to be moving, however slowly, towards a more inclusive, participatory model of democracy.

Civil society refers to that part of social, as distinct from corporate, life that lies beyond the immediate control of the state. It is the society of households, family networks, civic and religious organizations and communities that are bound to each other by shared histories, collective memories and culturally specific forms of reciprocity. As a political concept, however, democratic theory posits civil society as a counterpole to the state, the ultimate source of a people’s sovereignty. In this sense, civil society is composed of citizens, that is, of the members of a political community who claim not only the right to hold the state accountable but also the right to claim new rights for themselves. Among these are the right to voice, the right to difference, and the right to human flourishing.

These three rights are at the source of civil society’s deep involvement with the production of the urban habitat. Market and state do not explain it all; we must also reckon with civil action which is sometimes proactive, at other times filled with anger, protest, and defiance.

This new perception of the role of civil society, along with the partial retreat of the state from its traditional responsibilities, has dramatically changed what planners do. In this new scenario, they are no longer exclusively concerned with the central guidance of market forces or regulation. The new, emerging form of planning is more entrepreneurial, more daring and less codified. Typically, it is collaborative, as Patsy Healey has reminded us, concerned with large-scale projects more than with the entire system of spatial relations in the city, it seeks to forge a limited consensus through negotiated settlements among contesting parties; it is a provider of strategic information to all participants in the planning process. In these terms, planning moves ever closer to the surface of politics as a mediating band within society as a whole. Its expertise is increasingly being sought not only by the state, where planning powers formally reside, but also by the corporate sector and even by organized groups within civil society itself. I have taken these thoughts from the editors’ introduction of a new collection of essays, entitled Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age, which Mike Douglass of the University
of Hawaii and I have put together for publication by Wiley early next year. These essays represent a collective effort to talk about the second major new theme in the discourse on planning theory.

The third theme is power. I have already talked about how reluctant planning theorists generally are to incorporate dimensions of power into their work. We have consequently had little to say on the implementation strategies of specific actors, being more concerned with the extent of their formal adherence to particular planning-theoretic models.

I think it is important, when we talk about power, to distinguish between power that is used to coerce, constrain and control the actions of others and that which is enabling people to do the things they would like to do individually and collectively. Michel Foucault’s name is associated with the first view of power, and his popular writings are filled with emancipatory passion. My own recent work, considerably more modest in influence and scope, reflects an enabling view of power. In The Politics of Alternative Development, I speak of the individual, social and political empowerment of the oppressed sectors of society. Mine is the obverse of Foucault’s preoccupation with the micro-politics of dominance and coercion. It is rather a planner’s affirmation of how marginalized groups can begin to assert themselves in everyday life.

Others, and I have already mentioned the Danish scholar Bent Flyvbjerg, are more concerned with unveiling the real relations of power in the interplay of city-building processes. That, too, is an important and necessary task. All told, I would like to urge those of us who are committed to the further development of planning theory to build relations of power – and especially enabling power – into our conceptual framework. This will be done more readily once we ground our theorizing in the actual politics of city-building, acknowledging that the production of urban space involves the interaction of conflicting interests and forces, not least the growing force of organized civil society itself.

I must refrain from a summing up of my quick return to the past. There can be no conclusions. We are, after all, engaged in a continuing search to improve the practice of planning through the power of theory. And that is an ongoing effort that must remain open to the future.

Note
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New Directions in Planning Theory
Susan S. Fainstein

Abstracts
The author examines three approaches to planning theory: the communicative model, the new urbanism, and the just city. The first type emphasizes the planner’s role in mediating among “stakeholders;” the second paints a physical picture of a desirable planned city, and the third presents a model of spatial relations based on equity. Differences among the types reflect an enduring tension between a focus on the planning process and an emphasis on desirable outcomes. The author defends the continued use of the just-city model and a modified form of the political economy mode of analysis that underlies it.

The past decade has witnessed a reinvigoration of theoretical discussion within the discipline of planning. Inspired by postmodernist cultural critique and by the move among philosophers away from logical positivism toward a substantive concern with ethics and public policy, planning theorists have reframed their debates over methods and programs to encompass issues of discourse and inclusiveness. In the 1970s and 1980s, proponents of positivist scientific analysis battled advocates of materialist political economy. Although the divide between positivists and their opponents persists, other issues have come to define the leading edge of planning theory. Contemporary disagreements concern the usefulness of Habermasian communicative rationality, the effect of physical design on social outcomes (an old debate resurfaced), and the potential for stretching a postmodernist political economy approach to encompass a more complex view of social structure and social benefits than was envisioned by materialist analysis. Although discussions of communicative theory and political economy have transpired within academic journals and books, the body of planning thought concerned with physical design has grabbed public notice and received considerable attention within popular media. Building on widespread dissatisfaction with the anonymity and sprawl of contemporary urban
growth, the "new urbanism" espouses an outcome-based view of planning based on a vision of a compact, heterogeneous city.

In this article, I discuss and critique contemporary planning theory in terms of its usefulness in addressing what I believe to be its defining question: What is the possibility of consciously achieving widespread improvement in the quality of human life within the context of a global capitalist political economy? I examine the three approaches referred to earlier under the rubrics of (1) the communicative model, (2) the new urbanism, and (3) the just city. In my conclusion, I defend the continued use of the just-city model and a modified form of the political economy mode of analysis that underlies it.

The first type, sometimes called the collaborative model, emphasizes the planner's role in mediating among "stakeholders" within the planning situation; the second, frequently labeled neotraditionalism, paints a physical picture of a desirable city to be obtained through planning; and the third, which derives from the political economy tradition, although also outcome-oriented, is more abstract than the new urbanism, presenting a model of spatial relations based on equity. This typology of planning theories is not exhaustive – there remain defenders of the traditionally dominant paradigm of the rational model, as well as incrementalists who base their prescriptions on neoclassical economics, and Corbusian modernists, who still promote formalist physical solutions to urban decay. Nor are the types wholly mutually exclusive – each contains some elements of the others, and some theorists cannot be fit easily into one of the types. Nevertheless, each type can claim highly committed proponents, and each points to a distinctive path for both planning thought and planning practice.

Differences among the types reflect the enduring tension within planning thought between a focus on the planning process and an emphasis on desirable outcomes. In the recent past, neither tendency has fully dominated because theoretical orientations toward process and outcome have respectively affected different aspects of practice. Thus the concept of the rational model represented an approach based wholly on process, with little regard either to political conflict or to the specific character of the terrain on which it was working. As Beare (1987, 367) put it, "In its fullest development, the Rational Model had neither subject nor object. It ignored the nature of the agents who carried out planning and was indifferent to the object of their efforts [i.e., the built environment]." This model has provided the metatheory for planning activity in the decades since the 1960s, incorporating the faith in scientific method that swept through the social sciences during the cold war period. Within planning practice, it has primarily been used for forecasting impacts and for program evaluation. At the same time, however, as the rational model held sway among theorists, planning practitioners engaged in the development of zoning and environmental regulations, upholding an atheoretical, physical outcome-oriented vision of what Jacobs (1961, 22-25) sarcastically termed the "radiant garden city."

Outcome-oriented physical planning has left its mark on metropolitan areas in the form of urban renewal, low-density development, and spatial and functional segregation.

Although the rational model and the physical master plan were the dominant, late twentieth-century modes of planning practice throughout the world, they did not escape a powerful critique. Their opponents, who decried the distributional consequences of these approaches, generally adopted a political economic analysis. From this standpoint, critics persistently inquired into who benefited from planning efforts and associated themselves with social movements seeking to block displacement of low-income urban inhabitants, build affordable housing, halt the movement of capital out of distressed cities, and ameliorate racial, ethnic, and gender disadvantage.

The recent theoretical moves involved in the typology
sketched earlier represent a reaction both to previously dominant modes of thought and also to events "on the ground." Thus the communicative model responds to the imposition of top-down planning by experts deploying an Enlightenment discourse that posits a unitary public interest to be achieved through application of the rational model, the new urbanism is a backlash to market-driven development that destroys the spatial basis for community, and the just-city formulation reacts to the social and spatial inequality engendered by capitalism. In common with earlier critics of the rational model (see Fainstein and Fainstein 1979), theorists within all three schools doubt the applicability of the scientific method to urban questions; none of the three approaches relies on scientific justification as the rationale for its vision. Whatever their differences, they are all three postpositivist.

The Communicative Model
The communicative model draws on two philosophical approaches: American pragmatism as developed in the thought of John Dewey and Richard Rorty and the theory of communicative rationality as worked out by Jürgen Habermas. The two strands differ somewhat in their methodologies. Neopragmatism tends toward empiricism, with its exemplars searching for instances of best practices within planning from which generalizations can be drawn. Thus

The big question for the pragmatic analysts is how practitioners construct the free spaces in which democratic planning can be institutionalized. The idea...is to uncover examples of planning that are both competent and democratic, and then to explore who the practitioners were who did it, what actions they took to make it happen, and what sorts of institutional conditions helped or hindered their efforts. (Hoch 1996, 42)

Communicative rationality starts instead with an abstract proposition. According to Healey (1996, 239), A communicative conception of rationality... replaces[s] that of the self-conscious autonomous subject using principles of logic and scientifically formulated empirical knowledge to guide actions. This new conception of reasoning is arrived at by an intersubjective effort at mutual understanding. This refocuses the practices of planning to enable purposes to be communicatively discovered.

Pragmatism and communicative rationality emerge from different philosophical traditions. Whereas Dewey's work comes out of British philosophical realism and empiricism, Habermas's original approach traces back to Hegelian idealism and Marxist critical analysis and then later to Wittgenstein's scrutiny of language. Pragmatism and communicative rationality, however, converge when used to provide a guide for action to planners. This guide is the antithesis of Daniel Burnham's admonition to "make no small plans," an ambition that was once seen to embody the noblest aims of planning. Within communicative theory, the planner's primary function is to listen to people's stories and assist in forging a consensus among differing viewpoints. Rather than providing technocratic leadership, the planner is an experiential learner, at most providing information to participants but primarily being sensitive to points of convergence. Leadership consists not in bringing stakeholders around to a particular planning content but in getting people to agree and in ensuring that whatever the position of participants within the socioeconomic hierarchy, no group's interest will dominate.

Judith Innes (1998, 52) commented that "what planners do most of the time is talk and interact" and that "this 'talk' is a form of practical, communicative action." Innes (1995, 183) contended that the communicative model, which establishes the planner as negotiator and intermediary among stakeholders, has become
so widely accepted as to form "planning theory's emerging paradigm." Healey (1997, 29) summarized this theoretical turn as comprising the following emphases:

1. All forms of knowledge are socially constructed; 2. Knowledge and reasoning may take many different forms, including storytelling and subjective statements; 3. Individuals develop their views through social interaction; 4. People have diverse interests and expectations and these are social and symbolic as well as material; 5. Public policy needs to draw upon and make widely available a broad range of knowledge and reasoning drawn from different sources.

Theoretical and Practical Deficiencies
In its effort to save planning from elitist tendencies, communicative planning theory runs into difficulties. The communicative model should not be faulted for its ideals of openness and diversity. Rather, its vulnerability lies in a tendency to substitute moral exhortation for analysis. Although their roots, via Habermas, are in critical theory, once the communicative theorists move away from critique and present a manual for action, their thought loses its edge. Habermas postulated the ideal speech situation as a criterion by which to register the distortion inherent in most interactions. As such, it supplies a vehicle for demystification. But when instead ideal speech becomes the objective of planning, the argument takes a moralistic tone, and its proponents seem to forget the economic and social forces that produce endemic social conflict and domination by the powerful. There is the assumption that if only people were reasonable, deep structural conflict would melt away. Although unquestionably many disagreements can be ameliorated through negotiation - the attainment of exactions or planning gain6 from developers by community groups offers an example - persistent issues of displacement as a consequence of modernization and siting of unwanted facilities proximate to weak constituencies are less susceptible to resolution. Even when relatively powerless groups may prevail in individual instances – usually as a result of threat, not simply acknowledgment of their viewpoint within a planning negotiation – they still suffer from systemic bias and typically end up with meager, often symbolic benefits. The communicative theorists make the role of the planner the central element of discussion. Both the context in which planners work and the outcome of planning fade from view. Unlike the rational modelers, the communicative theorists have found a subject, but like them, they lack an object. Whereas in legal theory the object of analysis is the relationship between the legal system and society and in medical theory the concern is with the human body, in communicative planning theory the spotlight is on the planner. Instead of asking what is to be done about cities and regions, communicative planners typically ask what planners should be doing, and the answer is that they should be good (i.e., tell the truth, not be pushy about their own judgments). Like the technocrats whom they criticize, they appear to believe that planners have a special claim on disinterested morality:

Planners must routinely argue, practically and politically, about desirable and possible futures... They may be sincere but mistrusted, rigorous but unappreciated, reassuring yet resented. Where they intend to help, planners may instead create dependency; and where they intend to express good faith, they may raise expectations unrealistically, with disastrous consequences. But these problems are hardly inevitable. When planners recognize the practical and communicative nature of their actions, they can devise strategies to avoid these problems and to improve their practice as well. (Forester 1989, 138-39)
The present trend among communicative planning theorists is to avoid broad examinations of the relationship between planning, politics, and urban development. Much recent work in planning theory has been devoted to examining the meanings of planners' conversations with developers and city officials, deconstructing planning documents, and listening to planners' stories:

The challenge we face, as planners and policy analysts more broadly, is...to listen carefully to practice stories [i.e., stories of planning in practice] and to understand who is attempting what, why, and how, in what situation, and what really matters in all that. That challenge is not just about words but about our cares and constraints, our real opportunities and our actions, our own practice, what we really can, and should, do now. (Forester 1993, 202)

Katha Pollitt (1999, 35), bemoaning a tendency toward solipsism among feminist writers, commented that

"The personal is political" did not mean that personal testimony, impressions and feelings are all you need to make a political argument. The important texts of feminism have, in fact, been rather un-self-revealing. Simone de Beauvoir spent more than 700 pages in "The Second Sex" analyzing women's position in society through every conceivable lens: anthropological, economic, historical, literary, psychoanalytic, biological, philosophical, legal – except that of her own life.

Similarly, the concern of communicative planning theory, itself influenced by feminism, has become subjective interpretation rather than the identification of causes, constraints, and substantive outcomes (see Campbell and Fainstein 1996). In fact, the search for explanation either gets lost in the thick of hermeneutics or dismissed as totalizing (Milroy 1991; Beauregard 1991). The assumption is that explanation is necessarily reductionist. Yet even if we accept the premise that the purpose of planning theory is simply to tell planners what they ought to be doing, such knowledge depends on an accurate appraisal of the situation in which planners find themselves. Explanatory theory allows the observer to identify the general characteristics of a situation, and these characteristics cannot be inferred simply through the examination of discourse (Yiftachel forthcoming). This is not to deny the usefulness of experiential learning or of case analysis in contributing to understanding. But it does mean transcending individual experience, placing cases in a broad context, making comparisons, and not limiting analysis to exegesis.

In addition to questions of method, communicative theory runs into the fundamental issues of pluralist theory. Communicative theorists avoid dealing with the classic topic of what to do when open processes produce unjust results. They also do not consider the possibility that paternalism and bureaucratic modes of decision making may produce desirable outcomes. Various studies of the European welfare states and of the New Deal in the United States have concluded that the principal measures for ensuring health and security were generated by state officials with little reference to interested publics (see Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Mencher 1967; Skocpol 1985). Even though these measures would not have been approved without supportive constituencies and the threat of oppositional social movements, the actual formulation of policy (i.e., the planning of it) was highly insulated from stakeholder input.

Healey (1997) used the term collaborative planning to describe the process by which participants arrive at an agreement on action that expresses their mutual interests. She argued against a structuralist or political economy approach by contending that people do not have fixed interests. In other words, a
particular structural position (e.g., capitalist) does not automatically produce a particular policy position (e.g., deregulation). Discussion can lead capitalists to understand how they could benefit financially from environmental regulation when they might reflexively have opposed any attempt to restrict their freedom to pollute. And indeed, the vulgar marxist view that interests can be immediately inferred from relations to the means of production is indefensible. The marked differences between the attitudes of American and European business executives toward the interventionist state, whereby Europeans are much more accepting of state leadership, indicates the extent to which interpretations of interest by groups in similar structural positions can vary. Nevertheless, the different perceptions of interest held by those in different structural positions are not resolved simply through the exchange of ideas. If European and American business leaders have different perceptions of interest, ideas alone are not the cause. Rather, they exist in different historical contexts and different fields of power. Major changes in perceptions of interest require restructuration as a consequence of crisis or of a social movement, not simply verbal assent (Lukacs 1971). Even if perceptions of interest are biased or misdirected by distorted speech and even if structures are socially constructed, changing speech alone does not transform structures. An intervening stage of mobilization is required. Ideas can give rise to social movements that in turn change consciousness, ultimately resulting in the adoption of new public policy, but this is more than a matter of negotiation and consensus building among stakeholders. In the instances of both environmentalism and neoliberalism, discontent among influential fractions of the population became a social force when mobilized by a set of ideas that seemed to define a reason for feelings of dissatisfaction. The aroused consciousness that puts ideas into practice involves leadership and the mobilization of power, not simply people reasoning together. Moreover, transformative social movements, whether conservative like neoliberalism or progressive like environmentalism, themselves contain distortions. Marx and Engels (1947), in their critique of the Hegelians, asserted that the world was changed through struggle, not the force of ideas. They did not mean, as they are often misinterpreted, that economic structures automatically determine outcomes and that human agency is helpless to affect them. But they did mean that words will not prevail if unsupported by a social force carrying with it a threat of disruption. To put this another way, the power of words depends on the power of the speakers. To quote Bent Flyvbjerg (1998, 234), "When we understand power we see that we cannot rely solely on democracy based on rationality to solve our problems."

The theoretical lacunae of communicative theory reveal themselves in practice. Scrutiny of efforts to base planning on dialogue reveals serious problems of implementation and the continued dominance of the already powerful. Perhaps the most interesting contemporary example of a conscious effort toward meaningful, inclusive, consensual planning has been in South Africa. There the transitional situation, after the elimination of apartheid and before the establishment of new local governments, presented a unique opportunity for developing policies outside normally constraining structures. Preexisting policies and institutions did not require typical deference, and huge policy areas were open to new determinations. Yet, as described by Mary Tomlinson (1998, 144-45),

The loudly acclaimed „consensus” [on housing policy] supposedly hammered out by the stakeholders in the National Housing Forum which should have been achieved by hard bargaining among the parties was, in fact, the result of fudging vital differences between them. Faced with a conflict of vision between those who favoured a market-oriented strategy led by the private sector, and those who preferred a more “people-centred” approach in which
“communities” would be the central players – or at least retain a veto – the forum parties opted for both, despite their incompatibility. Thus all parties wanted immediate and visible delivery – but some also wanted “empowerment.” So both were included, despite the fact that they would prove to be contradictory in practice.

By the second year of implementation of the housing subsidy scheme the consensus hammered out at the National Housing Forum had not, as its architects hoped, succeeded in binding all key housing interests to the policy: some key political actors had not been party to its formulation – and therefore did not feel bound by it – while crucial private interests proved ready to abandon it if it conflicted with their interests, or if it did not seem to produce the rate of delivery that had hoped to achieve.

A study of the implementation of the economic development plan for South Africa’s Western Cape, which was also devised in a policy forum, comes to a strikingly similar conclusion:

Amongst the public of Cape Town, the plan [produced by the Western Cape Economic Development Forum] is probably better known than any before it: it is frequently referred to, usually in a positive light. It remains, however, a paper plan and an abstract vision. On the ground large-scale private investors have continued to follow their own locational logic, and low-income housing has continued to spread in low-density fashion on the city edge, where cheaper land is available. Certain of the well located parcels of land earmarked by the plan for low-income housing were allocated to Olympic sports facilities or other upmarket developments, others still stand empty. (Watson 1998, 347)

Innes (1996) used the example of the New Jersey State Plan to demonstrate the efficacy of the communicative model. Here stakeholders from throughout the state participated in a series of meetings that produced a document targeting some areas for growth or redevelopment and others for conservation. Implementation depended on “cross acceptance,” whereby localities, rather than being forced to conform to the statewide plan, would agree to conduct their planning in accordance with it in return for certain benefits.

Yet the same issues that cropped up in South Africa affected the implementation of the New Jersey State Plan. To start with, to win approval of the various participants in the planning process, the plan contained only weak requirements for the construction of affordable housing, suburban integration, and compact development, even though lack of housing for low-income residents, suburban exclusion of the poor and minorities, and lack of open space were identified as the principal problems that planning was supposed to overcome. Then, despite the moderate nature of the plan and the crossacceptance process, its implementation has been half-hearted at best and often strongly resisted by local planning boards. The principal result of consensual planning in New Jersey has been the continuance of a system whereby the market allocates land uses.14 These examples point to one problem of communicative planning in practice – the gap between rhetoric and action. The problem is perhaps most severe in the United States, where historic antagonism to a powerful administrative state has always limited the possibility of implementing any plan, regardless of how formulated (see Foglesong 1986). In Europe, where power is more centralized, corporatist bargaining has been institutionalized, and locally based interest groups are less able to block state action and the devolution of planning power to stakeholders; hence their assent to a plan is more likely to produce tangible results. Even there, however, agreement by participants to a document does not necessarily mean that anything will happen.
A second practical problem of communicative planning is the lengthy time required for such participatory processes, leading to burnout among citizen participants and disillusion as nothing ever seems to get accomplished. Cynical South Africans referred to the various policy forums as “talking shops.” A third issue arises from the difficulties involved in framing alternatives when planners desist from agenda setting. Thus, for example, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the city established a neighborhood planning process whereby residents formulated five-year plans for their neighborhoods and were allocated fairly substantial sums of money to spend. Planners assigned to facilitate the process were committed to a nondirective role and therefore only proposed actions when asked. The result was that some neighborhoods reached creative solutions, especially when participants were middle-class professionals, but others floundered in attempting to rank priorities and to come up with specific projects, sometimes taking as many as three years to determine a vague and hard-to-implement plan (Fainstein and Hirst 1996).

Finally, there is a potential conflict between the aims of communicative planning and the outcomes of participatory planning processes if planning is conducted within narrow spatial boundaries. The familiar specter of NIMBYism (not in my backyard) raises its head whenever participation is restricted to a socially homogeneous area. Communicative theorists are committed to equity and diversity, but there is little likelihood that such will be the outcome of stakeholder participation within relatively small municipalities. Organizing planning across a metropolitan area to encompass diversity of class, race, and ethnicity requires extending the process through multiple political jurisdictions to escape the homogeneity imposed by spatial segregation. The obstacles to involving citizens in metropolitan-wide planning, however, are enormous, and doing so means sacrificing the local familiarity that is the rationale for participatory neighborhood planning.

The failures of planning during the heyday of massive urban renewal programs substantiate many of the objections to top-down, expert-driven planning and make desirable the communicative turn in planning. Nevertheless, the cruelties of massive clearance programs were not simply the result of deference to expertise. In the United States, business and political interests, not experts, constituted the power base on which the urban renewal endeavor was mounted, and the experts directing the programs were almost all physical determinists drawn from the design and engineering professions rather than planners and housing analysts (Gans 1968, chap. 18). The federal government terminated the program precisely when reforms, instigated by mobilized community groups and in reaction to urban civil disorder, had made it more sensitive to affected communities and less profitable for developers; this turn of events illustrates how problematic any policy is that circumvents power relations. Moreover, the present generation of planners is more likely to be responsive to the needs of neighborhood residents and ordinary citizens. To the extent that they are not, the difficulty can only be partially remedied by open processes. City building for the benefit of nonelite groups requires empowering those who are excluded not just from discussions but from structural positions that allow them genuine influence. Ability to participate is one resource in the struggle for power, but it must be bolstered by other resources, including money, access to expertise, effective organization, and media coverage. Communicative theorists probably would not deny the importance of these resources, but neither do their analyses dwell on them. This omission constitutes the fundamental weakness of the theory.

The New Urbanism

New urbanism refers to a design-oriented approach to planned urban development. Developed primarily by architects and journalists, it is perhaps more ideology
than theory, and its message is carried not just by academics but by planning practitioners and a popular movement. New urbanists have received considerable attention in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Great Britain. Their orientation resembles that of the early planning theorists – Ebenezer Howard, Frederic Law Olmsted, Patrick Geddes – in their aim of using spatial relations to create a close-knit social community that allows diverse elements to interact. The new urbanists call for an urban design that includes a variety of building types, mixed uses, intermingling of housing for different income groups, and a strong privileging of the “public realm.” The basic unit of planning is the neighborhood, which is limited in physical size, has a well-defined edge, and has a focused center: “The daily needs of life are accessible within the five minute-walk” (Kunstler 1996, 117).

The new urbanism stresses the substance of plans rather than the method of achieving them. In practice, it has stimulated the creation of a number of new towns and neighborhoods, of which Seaside, in Florida, is the best known. Fundamental to its development has been a critique of American suburbia:

In the postwar era, suburbia became the lifestyle of choice for most Americans. While this new way of living had many advantages, it also fragmented our society – separating us from friends and relatives and breaking down the bonds of community that had served our nation so well in earlier times. The costs of suburban sprawl are all around us – they’re visible in the creeping deterioration of once proud neighborhoods, the increasing alienation of large segments of society, a constantly rising crime rate and widespread environmental degradation. (Katz 1994, ix)

In this analysis, suburbia is responsible for far more than traffic congestion on the freeway and aesthetically unappealing strip-mall development. It is also the producer of crime and anomie. In its easy elision of physical form with social conditions, the new urbanism displays little theoretical rigor. Unlike other trends in planning, however, it is noteworthy for the popular response it has achieved. Although its appeal results partly from widespread dissatisfaction with suburban development and nostalgia for traditional forms, it also stems from the strong advocacy of its supporters, who have joined together in the Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU). The new urbanists do not fear playing the role disdained by the communicative theorists – that of persuasive salespersons for a particular point of view and deployers of strategies aimed at co-opting people. Thus Andres Duany unabashedly declared,

Now, although it’s important to be flexible, open to new ideas, it’s also important, when you confront the world to maintain principles that are inviolate – one thing you can learn from LeCorbusier is that to influence and persuade, you must be polemical. You can’t convince people by equivocating, by saying ”Well, on the one hand this, on the other that.” You’ll bore them, and they’ll chew you up. As a polemicist you have to clarify matters… And you have to attack. Whenever I’m invited to speak to the Urban Land Institute [an organization of property developers], I try to destabilize them with my certainty that they are wrong. (“Urban or Suburban?” 1997, 48)

Duany did make a gesture toward participatory planning in his endorsement of citizen involvement in the charrette, the lengthy design workshop that furnished the details of his developments. But one suspects that the purpose is as much co-optive as informative. When asked whether his use of neotraditional architectural styles was ”like your use of language, a way of concealing what you’re doing,” he replied, ”Yes, exactly.” He commented that architects who insist on using a style without mass appeal, by which he meant high
modernism, are "separating themselves from where the power really is, which is the ability of architecture to transform society, to be of genuine social benefit" ("Urban or Suburban?" 1997, 60). Thus Duany and his confederates in the CNU did not fear distorted speech, nor did they shrink from using democratic procedures in responding to the public's stylistic preferences as a screen to achieve their desired sociospatial arrangements.

Critique
The new urbanism is vulnerable to the accusation that its proponents oversell their product, promoting an unrealistic environmental determinism that has threaded its way throughout the history of physical planning. Harvey (1997, 1) praised certain aspects of the new urbanism – its emphasis on public space, its consideration of the relationship between work and living, and its stance toward environmental quality. Nevertheless, his endorsement was mixed:

But my real worry is that the movement repeats at a fundamental level the same fallacy of the architectural and planning styles it criticizes. Put simply, does it not perpetuate the idea that the shaping of spatial order is or can be the foundation for a new moral and aesthetic order? ... The movement does not recognize that the fundamental difficulty with modernism was its persistent habit of privileging spatial forms over social processes. (Harvey 1997, 2)

As a consequence of its spatial determinism, the new urbanism runs into certain dangers. One frequently made criticism is that it merely calls for a different form of suburbia rather than overcoming metropolitan social segregation. Duany responded to this accusation by arguing that because most Americans are going to live in suburbs, planners need to build better suburbs. Moreover, he contended that it is not his philosophy but, rather, political opposition and obsolete zoning ordinances that prevent him from working in inner cities ("Urban or Suburban?" 1997). And indeed, the effort to overcome the environmentally destructive, wasteful form of American suburban development constitutes the most important contribution of the new urbanism to the commonweal.

The movement is less convincing in its approach to social injustice. Harvey (1997) feared that the new urbanism can commit the same errors as modernism – of assuming that changing people's physical environment will somehow take care of the social inequalities that warped their lives. To be sure, with its emphasis on community, it is unlikely to commit the principal sin of modernist redevelopment programs – destroying communities to put people in the orderly environments that were thought to enhance living conditions. The real problem replicates the one that defeated Ebenezer Howard's radical principles in the construction of garden cities. To achieve investor backing for his schemes, Howard was forced to trade away his aims of a socialist commonwealth and a city that accommodated all levels of society (Fishman 1977). The new urbanists must also rely on private developers to build and finance their visions; consequently, they are producing only slightly less exclusive suburbs than the ones they dislike. Although their creations will contain greater physical diversity than their predecessors, their social composition will not differ markedly.

Harvey (1997) also worried that the new urbanist emphasis on community disregards "the darker side" of communitarianism. He claimed that "community' has ever been one of the key sites of social control and surveillance bordering on overt social repression... As a consequence, community has often been a barrier to rather than facilitator of progressive social change" (p. 3). He was apprehensive that the enforced conformity of community blocks the creativity arising from diversity and conflict. He thus raised issues that have been major points of debate in discussions of institutionalized community participation among supporters of
redistributive measures (see Fainstein 1990): Advocates argue that community power raises the self-esteem of members, whereas opponents fear that it produces parochialism and failure to recognize broader class interests (Katznelson 1981; Piven 1970). Two problems come to the fore here. The classic and more important dilemma results from the two-edged quality of community, which in providing emotional sustenance to its members, necessarily excludes others. A second problem arises within theories of planning and urban design that urge the creation of exciting locales: Is planned diversity an oxymoron? Although Jacobs’s (1961) critique of modernist planning undergirds much of the new urbanism, she would probably repudiate its effort to prescribe what in her view must be spontaneous. And truly, if one visits the world’s planned new towns and downtown redevelopment projects, even those built with commitments to diversity and community, one is struck by their physical and social homogeneity:

Sad managed, the cornerstones of Jacobsian urbanism—picturesque shops piled high with imported goods, mustachioed hot-dog vendors in front of improvised streetcorner fountains, urban life considered as one enormous national-day festival are cruelly mimicked in every Rouse market [i.e., festival marketplace developed by the Rouse Corporation] and historic district on the [American] continent. Contemporary developers have found it eminently easy to furnish such obvious symbols of urbanism, while at the same time eliminating the racial, ethnic, and class diversity that interested Jacobs in the first place. (Boddy 1992, 126n)

At the same time, relying on the market for an alternative to planning will not overcome the problem of homogeneity. The failure of the market to provide diversity in most places means that if planners do not attempt to foster it, the outcome will be increasingly segregated neighborhoods and municipalities. Nevertheless, the new urbanism, with its focus on physical form, will not do the job either:

The reification of physical models is used by the architects of New Urbanism as a strategy to create local community, by reproducing a physical environment that fosters greater casual social contact within the neighborhood. However, these architects fail to sufficiently consider segregation within the greater urban area according to class race and ethnicity, and may, in fact, help perpetuate it. (Lehrer and Milgrom 1996, 15)

Only a publicly funded effort to combine social groups through mixing differently priced housing with substantial subsidies for the low-income component can produce such a result. The new urbanists seek to create housing integration but, in their reliance on private developers, are unable to do so on a sufficient scale or across a broad enough range of housing prices to have a significant effect. However, a serious effort to attract public subsidy for the low-income component of their communities would involve the new urbanists in a political battle for which their architectural training and aesthetic orientation offer few resources. The appeal of Victorian gingerbread and Cape Cod shingle would not override the fear of racial and social integration. For planning theory, the most interesting aspect of the new urbanism is that its assurance of a better quality of life has inspired a social movement. Its utopianism contrasts with communicative planning, which offers only a better process. Thus there is a model of planning practice that is based not on the picture of the sensitive planner who listens and engages in ideal speech but on the messianic promise of the advocate who believes in a cause and eschews neutrality. As in all such cases, the benefits are exaggerated. But there is an attraction to the doctrine, both because of its helpfulness and because the places it seeks to create do
appeal to anyone tired of suburban monotony and bland modernism.

**The Just City**

In *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels ([1892] 1935, 54) presents the Marxian critique of utopianism:

> The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.

For Marx and Engels, social transformation could occur only when the times were ripe, when circumstances enabled the forces for social amelioration to attain their objectives. In their view, utopian thinkers, such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, could not succeed because they developed a social ideal that did not coincide with a material reality still dominated by capitalist interests: Only smashing the structure of class domination could create the conditions for achieving a just society. Attainment of this goal, however, would not result from a passive acquiescence to historical forces. Engels laid out a role for intellectual understanding in bringing about a desirable transformation, as well as a picture of the future that only avoided the label of utopianism through an assertion of historic inevitability — the claim that once the working class seized power, it inevitably would create a just society:

> Once we understand [social forces] . . . when once we grasp their action, their direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to reach our own ends .... But when once their nature is understood they can, in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing servants... With this recognition at last of the real nature of the productive forces of today, the social anarchy of production gives place to a social regulation of production upon a definite plan, according to the needs of the community and of each individual. (Engels [1892] 1935, 68-69)

At the millennium's end, one can hardly be sanguine that the hegemony of any social grouping will produce outcomes that will fulfill "the needs of the community and of each individual." By considering such an outcome as an inevitable consequence of proletarian revolution, Marx and Engels could simultaneously dismiss a nonconflictual path to socialism as unrealizable and present their teleological vision of revolutionary socialism as both realistic and desirable. If one does not accept their theory of historical development, however, one must either face the problem of formulating goals and identifying agents or capitulate to whatever structure of social domination exists. In this situation, a rigorous belief that people are helpless before forces such as globalization, sectarianism, and the repressive apparatus of the state produces either stasis or, at best, simply resistance.²¹

This crisis of action has led to the revival of utopian thought among some thinkers on the Left. Harvey (forthcoming), for example, has broken with the Marxian critique of utopian idealism despite his continued adherence to other aspects of Marxian analysis.²² In his introduction to *Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference* (1996), he recounted his experience of attending an academic conference in an Atlanta hotel that was also hosting a convention of fundamentalist Christians. He was impressed by the much greater appeal of the Christians as compared to the academics, their greater Joyfulness. Thus his new interest in utopias arises partly out of a recognition that creating a force for change requires selling a concept — as Duany so forthrightly pointed out — making people think that they want what you are offering.²³ Depicting a
picture of a just city puts the planning theorist in the role of advocate – not necessarily the advocate for a particular group, as in Davidoff’s concept of advocacy planning – but as the advocate of a program. Just-city theorists fall into two categories: radical democrats and political economists. The former differ from communicative planning theorists in that they have a more radical concept of participation that goes beyond the involvement of stakeholders to governance by civil society, and they accept a conflictual view of society. They believe that progressive social change results only from the exercise of power by those who previously had been excluded from power. Participation is the vehicle through which that power asserts itself. The political economy group, upon whom I shall focus in this section and among whom I include myself, takes an explicitly normative position concerning the distribution of social benefits. It goes beyond neomarxism, however, in analyzing distributive outcomes as they affect non-class-based groupings and refusing to collapse noneconomic forms of domination into class categories. Until recently, the political economy tradition involved a critique of urban and regional phenomena based on values that were rarely made explicit (Fainstein 1997; Sayer and Storper 1997). Although clearly the principal value underlying such analyses was equity, the discussion usually proceeded by identifying unfairness without positing what was fair. There has been, however, an effort of late, paralleling and drawing on work in philosophy (e.g., Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Young 1990), which has broken with positivism and with postmodernist relativism. The purpose of this project has been to specify the nature of a good city (Harvey 1992, 1996; Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1997; Beauregard forthcoming).

The audience for this endeavor has remained vaguely defined. By inference, however, one can deduce that the principal target group is the leadership of urban social movements. Because political economic analysis mostly condemns policy makers for being the captive of business interests; it is addressed primarily to insurgent groups, to officials in progressive cities (Clavel 1986), and to “guerrillas in the bureaucracy” (Needleman and Needleman 1974). Whereas the communicative planning theorists primarily speak to planners employed by government, calling on them to mediate among diverse interests, just-city theorists do not assume the neutrality or benevolence of government (Marcuse 1986). For them, the purpose of their vision is to mobilize a public rather than to prescribe a methodology to those in office.

A theory of the just city values participation in decision making by relatively powerless groups and equity of outcomes (see Sandercock 1998). The key questions asked of any policy by political economists have been, Who dominates? and Who benefits? The “who” has typically been defined by economic interest, but economic reductionism is not necessary to this mode of analysis; evaluation of outcomes can also be conducted with regard to groups defined by gender, race, and sexual orientation. Nor does the emphasis on material equality need to boil down to an expectation that redistribution should proceed to a point at which there is no reward to achievement.

The characteristic weakness of socialist analysis has been its dismissal of economic growth as simply capital accumulation that benefits only capitalists. Socialist doctrine fails to mobilize a following if it only ensures greater equality without also offering improved circumstances for most people. The market model and neoliberalism have proved popular because they promise increases in affluence for all even if within the context of growing inequality.

Neomarxian analysis has shown that unregulated growth despoils the environment, primarily helps the upper echelons of the population, and even produces increased absolute deprivation at the bottom. Its attacks on the entrepreneurial state and its collaboration with private capital have delineated a collusion in which the interests of the majority have frequently been ignored.
(Squires 1989). Nevertheless, this critique did not point to a way in which the majority of the population can realize economic gains relative to their own previous position and, as a consequence, has lost popular support in the developed countries. A persuasive vision of the just city needs to incorporate an entrepreneurial state that not only provides welfare but also generates increased wealth; moreover, it needs to project a future embodying a middle-class society rather than only empowering the poor and disfranchised. Whereas Marx dismissed the Lumpenproletariat with contempt and placed his hopes with the working class, contemporary political economists tend to see society as consisting of the poor and the wealthy, ignoring the interests and desires of the vast middle mass and the aspirations for upward mobility of the working class. Yet, if substantive democracy is a constitutive element of a vision of social justice, then an antimajoritarian concept of society will not do. Recent work on industrial districts, social markets, local economic development, and national growth rates has pointed in a direction more sympathetic to middle-class aspirations (Storper 1997; Sayer and Walker 1991; Fainstein and Markusen 1993; Bluestone and Harrison 1997). Still, a great deal more attention needs to be paid to identifying a formula for growth with equity (Sanyal 1998). And such an approach has to take into account the perseverance of a capitalist world economy and the evident success, at least for the moment, of a liberalized U.S. economy. Participation in public decision making is part of the ideal of the just city, both because it is a worthy goal in itself and because benevolent authoritarianism is unlikely. At the same time, democracy presents a set of thorny problems that have never been theoretically resolved and can only be addressed within specific situations. The almost exclusive preoccupation with participation that has come to characterize much of leftist thought since the demise of socialism in the Soviet bloc evades the problems that have vexed democratic theory throughout its history. Democratic pluralism, with its emphasis on group process and compromise, offers little likelihood of escape from dominance by those groups with greatest access to organizational and financial resources. Democratic rule can deprive minorities of their livelihood, freedom, or self-expression. Classic democratic theory deals with this problem through imbuings minorities with rights that cannot be transgressed by majorities. But what of the minority that seeks to exercise its rights to seize power and take away the rights of others in the name of religious authority or racial superiority? Democratic principles can easily accommodate ineffective or harmless minorities; they founder when confronted with right-wing militias, religious dogmatists, and racial purists. Thus the appropriate criterion for evaluating a group’s claims should not be procedural rules alone; evaluation must comprise an analysis of whether realization of the group’s goals is possible and, if so, whether such realization leaves intact the principle of social justice. Democracy is desirable, but not always. Within a formulation of the just city, democracy is not simply a procedural norm but rather has a substantive content (see Pitkin 1967). Given the existing system of social domination, it cannot be assumed that participation by stakeholders would be transformative in a way that would improve most people’s situation. Consequently, deliberations within civil society are not ipso facto morally superior to decisions taken by the state. Rather, “it is the double-edged nature of the state, its ability to effect both regressive or progressive social change, that must be stressed” (Yiftachel 1998, 400). The state can do both good and bad, and likewise, so can the citizenry. As Abu-Lughod (1998, 232) put it, when one considers the wide range of associational groups within civil society that seek empowerment...some of them are downright evil, while others seem very admirable. Furthermore, some forms of associational organization seem
to be effective in achieving their goals whereas others, equally participatory, fail. Storper (1998, 240) picked up on her theme: Abu-Lughod goes right to the heart of the matter in suggesting that the form of civil society – e.g. decentralized, embracing a diversity of voices – does not have a straightforward relation to the content of those voices. In this she mirrors an old debate in political philosophy, especially modern democratic political philosophy, between democracy as a set of procedures and democracy as content or substance.

Applying the just-city perspective, one must judge results, and furthermore, one must not forget that the results attainable through public policy are seriously constrained by the economy. Thus, even when the principal concern is not economic outcomes but ending discrimination or improving the quality of the environment, economic interests limit possible courses of action. To go back to the example of the New Jersey State Plan mentioned earlier, its primary purpose was environmental protection, not social integration or redistribution of land and property. Nevertheless, its content was affected by the state’s dependence on private investors for new development and its implementation restricted by fears of landowners that their property values would be adversely affected by growth regulation. Thus economic interests impinge on planning even when the economy is not its foremost object.

As stated in the introduction to this article, the principal question of planning theory is the analysis of the possibility for attaining a better quality of human life within the context of a global capitalist political economy. One way to approach this question is to frame a model of the good city and to inquire how it is achievable. The model can be an abstract utopia – the cohesive city of the new urbanists’ dreams – or be derived from the identification of places that seem to provide an exceptionally good quality of life (thus conforming to Hoch’s 1996 description of pragmatic inquiry described earlier).

In a recent paper, I (Fainstein 1999) identified Amsterdam as comprising such an exemplar. Although not the embodiment of utopia, it contains many of the elements of the just city. If one considers the two other types of planning theory discussed here – communicative planning and the new urbanism – Amsterdam also conforms in many respects to their models. There is a highly consensual mode of decision making, with elaborate consultation of social groups and heavy reliance on third-sector organizations for implementation of policy. In conformity with the vision of the new urbanism, spatial forms are physically diverse, development is at very high density, and population is mixed by class and, to a lesser extent, ethnically. These achievements are within the context of a relatively equitable distribution of income, a very extensive welfare state, corporatist bargaining over the contours of the economy at the national level, and public ownership of urban land. All this came partly out of a tradition of planning and compromise but also out of militant struggle – by workers’ parties for much of the century and by squatters and street demonstrators more recently.

Amsterdam is, of course, a wealthy Western city, and the theories discussed here derive primarily from a Western discourse rooted in the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, they are applicable to the developing world, where the goal of growth with equity has been a long-standing one. Despite the contention of various Asian dictators that the concepts of democracy and rights constitute Western values, the very active global human rights movement and the rapid spread of democratic ideas throughout much of the non-Western world indicate widespread acceptance of these values. Heller’s analysis of the Indian state of Kerala supports this argument:
Kerala is a striking example of equitable development: Successive governments in this southwestern state of 29 million inhabitants have successfully pursued social and redistributive strategies of development that has few, if any, parallels in the nonsocialist developing world... The vigor and dynamism of civil society is matched only by the size and activism of the state. (Heller 1996, 1055)

In examining Amsterd and Kerala, one can see that democratic procedure was crucial to their development but also that it was insufficient. Required also was a structural situation of relative material equality as both precondition and outcome of development and a culture of tolerance and commitment to equity. Put another way, both Amsterdam and Kerala operated within a mode of regulation that permitted private capital accumulation and a market economy while maintaining a large nonmarket sector. Citizens of Amsterdam and Kerala thus possess a set of social rights, not just political rights (see Marshall 1965).

Resurrecting Optimism
The three types of planning theory described in this article all embrace social reformist outlook. They represent a move from the purely critical perspective that characterized much theory in the 1970s and 1980s to one that once again offers a promise of a better life. Whereas reaction to technocracy and positivism shaped planning theory of that period, more recent planning thought has responded to the challenge of postmodernism. It has therefore needed to assert the possibility of a guiding ethic in the face of the postmodernist attack on foundationalism:

The disrupting, enabling meaning of the postmodern is derived from the critique of universalism and the placing of difference and heterogeneity in the foreground, but such an opening remains consistently incomplete for some differences we may want to struggle against when they encapsulate inequality, and the heterogeneous, plural or local do not of themselves carry any necessarily empowering or emancipatory meaning. Clearly, the locally or regionally particular can be as violently oppressive as the centrally or globally universal. (Slater 1997, 57)

Communicative planning theory has evaded the issue of universalism by developing a general procedural ethic without substantive content. The new urbanists claim that their design prescriptions incorporate diversity and provide people what they really want rather than what archaic zoning laws and greedy developers impose on them. Thus, even though they have been criticized for imposing a particular formula on others, they defend themselves by arguing that their conception incorporates difference. Just-city theorists work from "the basic premise...that any distributional conception of social justice will inevitably be linked to the broader way of life in which people engage" (Smith 1997, 21). The argument is that although there may be no universal standards of good and bad, there are criteria for judging better and worse (Smith 1997; see also Fainstein 1997).

The progressives of the previous period spent much of their energy condemning traditional planning for authoritarianism, sexism, the stifling of diversity, and class bias. More recent theorizing has advanced from mere critique to focusing instead on offering a more appealing prospect of the future. For communicative planning, this means practices that allow people to shape the places in which they live; for new urbanists, it involves an urban form that stimulates neighborliness, community involvement, subjective feelings of integration with one's environment, and aesthetic satisfaction. For just-city theorists, it concerns the development of an urban vision that also involves material well-being but that relies on a more pluralistic,
cooperative, and decentralized form of welfare provision than the state-centered model of the bureaucratic welfare state.

At the millennium's end, then, planning theorists have returned to many of the past century's preoccupations. Like their nineteenth-century predecessors they are seeking to interpose the planning process between urban development and the market to produce a more democratic and just society. The communicative theorists have reasserted the moral preoccupations that underlay nineteenth-century radicalism, the new urbanists have promoted a return to concern with physical form, and just-city theorists have resurrected the spirit of utopia that inspired Ebenezer Howard and his fellow radicals. Although strategic and substantive issues separate the three schools of thought described here, they share an optimism that had been largely lacking in previous decades. Sustaining this optimism depends on translating it into practice.

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Notes


2. An op-ed piece in the New York Times noted, "When [the chairman of the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce]... talks wistfully about the need to re-create the European town square in urban America, he is expressing sentiments that have spread through his entire business community with remarkable speed and intensity" (Ehrenhalt 1999).

3. By this she meant both the suburban legacy of Ebenezer Howard's garden city movement and the urban reconstruction schemes of LeCorbusier and the international movement.

4. The principal theorists who have developed communicative theory in planning are Judith Innes, John Forster, Jean Hillier, Patsy Healey, Charles Hoch, and Seymour Mandelbaum. See especially Mandelbaum, Mazza, and Burchell (1996) for an extensive collection of essays developing this theme. For critiques of communicative planning theory, see Flyvbjerg (1998), Yftbachel (forthcoming), Laurie and Whelan (1995), and Tewdwr-Tones (1998).

5. See Muller (1998) for a critique of the applicability of Kuhn's concept of the paradigm to planning theory.

6. The terms exactions (in the United States) and planning gain (in the United Kingdom) refer to the granting of benefits – for example, contributions to a housing fund, building of a public facility, and so on – by developers in return for the right to develop.

7. Stone (1989) chronicled the minor victories and overall defeat of the African-American population of Atlanta within a series of planning decisions dominated by a business-oriented regime. Despite a black mayor and a significant black leadership cadre, "the [governing] coalition is centered around a combination of explicit and tacit deals. Reciprocity is thus the hallmark of Atlanta's regime, and reciprocity hinges on what one actor can do for another. Instead of promoting redistribution toward equality, such a system perpetuates inequality" (p. 241).

8. Healey (1997) is bothered by this aspect of the theory and seeks to overcome it. Her work is distinguished by greater attention to the object of planning than is the case for most of her colleagues in the communicative rationality group. Likewise, she is much less sanguine that good will triumph as a consequence of open discussion.

9. The first analytic case studies of planning were authored by political scientists (e.g., Altshuler 1965; Meyerson and Banfield 1955; Stone 1976) and did not contain this intense focus on the role of the planner.

10. It should be noted that much of Simone de Beauvoir's body of work did devote itself to an examination of her life; these writings, however, do not have the same theoretical importance or general applicability as The Second Sex. At the same time, they show the apparent contradictions between her general arguments and her life as lived, thereby raising important theoretical issues.
11. Healey (1997) again is an exception.
12. Lindblom (1990) took a similar position, arguing that interests are made, not discovered: He therefore preferred the term volition to interest.
13. The concept of stakeholder seems to imply that individuals and groups do have differing objective interests in a particular issue, even though the content of that interest is not fixed.
14. These conclusions are based on my own field observations.
15. American suburbs enjoy considerable autonomy and elicit substantial citizen participation in their planning processes. The outcome tends to be exclusionary zoning.
16. In a thesis examining four cases of military base conversion to peacetime uses, Hill (1998) found, contrary to her expectations, that in the most successful case, Boston’s Charlestown Navy Yard, citizen participation did not play a significant role, but politicians and planners with a commitment to neighborhood development and environmental protection produced a desirable outcome.
17. Influential proponents of this body of thought include Peter Calthorpe, James Howard Kunstler, Aaron Nelessen, and especially Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberg.
18. Within the United Kingdom, Charles, the Prince of Wales, has been associated with the neotraditional movement and has sponsored development in accordance with principles of the new urbanism. In Britain and other parts of Europe, however, many of the tenets of the new urbanism have always formed the basis of planning regulation and thus do not represent as much of a reorientation as in the United States.
19. Katz’s (1994) The New Urbanism contains pictures and plans of a number of these endeavors within the United States.
20. See Hamilton (1999) and Frantz and Collins (1999); these New York Times articles, published after the Littleton, Colorado, school massacre, traced problems of teenage alienation to suburban design and credited new urbanist forms with the potential to overcome them.
21. The reduction of oppositional action to simply resistance seems to be at the core of Foucault’s philosophy. See Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 207).
22. Friedmann (forthcoming) has also recently written a paper exploring this theme, as have I (Fainstein 1999).
23. According to Kumar (1991, 31), “In the abstract schemes of conventional social and political theory, we are told that the good society will follow from the application of the relevant general principles; in utopia we are shown the good society in operation, supposedly as a result of certain general principles of social organization.”
24. John Friedmann and Frank Fischer fit into this category. See Friedmann (forthcoming) and Fischer (forthcoming).
25. Healey (1998) emphasized the importance of institutional forms that will support economic development and tried to show how this can occur within the framework of collaborative planning. Her formulation is more applicable to those countries that already engage in corporatist decision making under the auspices of a social democratic state than it does to the United States.
26. See Day (1997) for the particular difficulties the concept presents to planners.
27. I do not deal here with the obviously fundamental issue of how one measures the quality of life, but see Nussbaum and Sen (1993) for a set of seminal essays on this subject.

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Why Planning Theory?  
Educating Citizens, Recognizing Differences, Mediating Deliberations  
John Forester

Planning theory can be practically pitched and ethically critical, too – if and only if it takes practice seriously. It must deal with the abiding problems of politics, the ambiguities of value, and the challenges of deliberative learning that confront planners every day. At the same time, it must assess three pressing questions: (1) How can planners educate or misinform affected publics? (2) How can planners recognize or neglect citizens’ particular histories and identities? and (3) How can planners mediate or fail to assist public negotiations? Any planning theory worth reading should also make us less complacent and more realistically hopeful than we have been.

Planning theory has two major concerns: planning institutions and planning practice. When we assess planning institutions, for example, not only do we face the challenges of understanding state-market relations, the subject of a vast literature, but we must also face questions of organizational and political design, something we do poorly in the planning literature as it stands. (Compare Mandelbaum et al. 1996.) When we assess planning practice, we need to do justice to the difficulties, mandates, and opportunities of planners day to day as they seek to do technical analysis, present arguments, build coalitions and empower or weaken constituencies, set agendas, define problems, negotiate, mediate, or engage in consensus-building efforts. My focus here is on the second of these two faces of planning theory.

Three Biases for Practice
A decent planning theory should help us understand the possibilities of planning practice. We should not read planning theory and have to wonder, “What does this have to do with what planners actually face at work?” Thus, planning theory should take planning practice seriously in at least three ways.

First, planning theory should begin with the experiences and strategies of planners working in the face of power and inequality, with the questions, What are planners...
up against? and How can they respond? We can call this "the bias for recognizing planning as a political activity." Second, we need to learn from "best practices," from the most insightful, innovative, and progressive planners we can identify, even though not all of their practice will be exemplary. In doing so, we will debate what "best" and "progressive" and even "innovative" can mean, as we should, given the lack of consensus on these terms that is to be expected. But, if we search for "best practices" and listen carefully, the skillful work of practitioners will help us refine our own research agendas in planning theory. We can call this "the bias for learning from practice."

Third, planning theory should help us to encourage the best practice we can imagine. Taking a tip from authors who show us how storytelling, literature, and drama can teach us vividly about what is at stake in real practice, we can develop critical and pragmatic planning theories enriched by powerful narrative accounts of planning practice (Forster 1995, 1999; Schön 1983). Seeking to complement vivid, even moving, description with political and ethical insight, we can call this "the bias for encouraging excellence in practice."

Beyond the "New Planning Theory"

Why worry about developing a better understanding of what planners do? Why develop better planning theory? We need to worry because we have been trained to be blind to important aspects of planning. Conventional social science would have us describe or explain "what planners do"; but, as laudable (and difficult) as those goals may be, we need to do much more, as Patsy Healey and Charles Hoch have recently shown us (Healey 1997; Hoch 1994). We would do better to think about planning theory in a new way. Planning theory is like a telescope: when it’s good, it lets us focus on what’s important in planning; when it’s bad, it gives us headaches, eye strain, and a fuzzy and confusing picture of what we’re doing. But it works over time: so insightful planning theory can help us to anticipate and respond in complex and conflictual political situations.

Even with the "new planning theory" and a new "paradigm" in the field, we are in danger of placing a misleading focus on "communication," when what we need is a better understanding of the precariousness, contingencies, and real possibilities of planning action (see Innes 1995; Teitz 1996). Knowing that such action is "communicative" is interesting only if it helps us understand how planning actions can be better or worse – with all the ambiguities that involves.

Whether stuck, wondering how to go on, or, in public, facing affected citizens, planners have to account for their actions in light of what they can do and what they should do. So our question should be neither, "What is planning?" nor "Why do planners do what they do?" but, rather, "How can – and how should – planners act in a precariously democratic, conflictual, highly politicized and unequal world?"

To answer those questions takes both institutional realism, for the account of actual possibilities, and careful normative thinking, too, to formulate, guide, and justify what should be done (Rorty 1988). Assessing how planners can and should act requires us to think carefully about politics, about value, and about the ways planners learn deliberatively in practice.

Politics

When planners must listen in the face of little time, plenty of exaggeration, relationships of distrust, and so on, they need good working theory to help them go on. Colloquially, we call this "the politics of information" or, more recently, "knowledge production." The analysis of planning should not imagine planning practice "in a vacuum"; good analysis must anticipate and help us to understand the institutional settings and pressures that actual planners must face.

Value

Don Schön’s seminal work on problem framing (Schön
1983, 1990) left the ethics of reflective practice fairly vague. Relying on “what works” in the case at hand sounds pragmatic, but it becomes problematic whenever those with the power to define the situation are up to no good. This is the abiding problem of “situational ethics.” Nevertheless, every time planners try to listen critically and not just take what they hear literally, they have to use some working planning theory to focus on, to make practical judgments about, what we can call, colloquially, “the facts that matter.” To do this means learning about value, not just values – and this is a challenge of ethics that we have barely touched (Forester 1999).

**Deliberation**
When planners must justify to affected citizens what they do, they must do it articulately, soundly, and with reasons that educate a broader public (unless we reduce planners to advertising-industry image makers). Of course, we can find numerous cases in which planners justify decisions already made, prime a public for bad news, or withhold important information so that decision makers may “govern” less accountably than they might were affected publics more informed. If, however, we are interested in the possibilities of an increasingly democratic planning practice, one in which decision makers and affected publics both learn from the analysis of possible futures, from planning, then the analysis of such planning must help us to better understand the forms and possibilities of political deliberation as planners may nurture it. Recent studies of planning go some distance in this direction, and they need to be extended (Healey 1997; Hoch 1994; Throgmorton 1997).

**The Changing Character of Interdependence**
As transportation and communication systems, trade, and investments expand their reach, they knit cities and regions, towns and communities ever closer together. As this public interdependence and interdisciplinary complexity increase, so will the need for planners increase; for, as uncertainty increases, so do decision makers’ needs for advice, for ways to protect investments, ways to hedge their bets. This suggests a common corollary: the more public decision makers face uncertainty (the bigger the apparent risks they face), the more will planning analysis be sought out, and the more may planners be listened to (if not heeded). Nevertheless, as public jurisdictions, levels of government, and even regional ecologies become more interdependent, planners will continue to be caught “in between” many actors, each facing much uncertainty, each searching for good advice in the face of the prospects of investing poorly. In these positions, planners increasingly will face the demands of politicians and bureaucrats (with their personal, strategic, or structural interests), as well as their more diffuse obligations to the “public,” organized and unorganized – indeed, born and not yet born. Thus, insofar as increasing interdependence signals increasing uncertainty as well, it promises an abiding public need for planning, and with that need come complex obligations for planners who find themselves challenged to work in between the claims of multiple and conflicting parties (Forester 1989).

As our understanding of interdependence becomes more sophisticated, we will come to understand correspondingly needed changes in planning methods and skills. We can see at least three recent developments here, each very different from the other.

**Public Education**
First, as Michael Teitz (1996) notes, we see today rapid advances in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and modeling capacities, with implications for our capacities for exploring and reframing problems. As we become able to represent, probe, and study our ecological, physical, social, and economic interdependencies more powerfully, we come to face an entirely new set of issues involving the "public education function" that
planners will increasingly serve — even if we understand it only poorly now. Not only do decision makers face increasing uncertainties, feel apparent risks, and worry about their vulnerabilities to the actions of others, so, too, do members of the public. This means, simply, that planners will increasingly play the roles of public educators, and with the advances all around us in information technologies, modeling capacities, access to the Internet, and the diffusion of personal computing technologies, the possibilities for presenting compelling public information are expanding as never before: graphically, visually, dramatically, and technologically.

**The Recognition of Difference**

Second, in the last decade, many in the planning profession have come to recognize much more clearly how race, gender, and ethnicity relate to social action. We are beginning to recognize more clearly the ambiguities and internal contradictions of "identity politics" and the "politics of difference" as they confront planners working with community diversity, with immigration, even in new ways with territorial disputes (Burayidi 1999; Sandercock 1998). In cases where continuing relationships are at stake, planners have to do much more than ask the simplistic question, "What do they want?" That question, of course, will often be worthwhile, but planners should not fool themselves by confusing deceptively simple answers — "money," "land," "control" — with the not-at-all simple people with whom they work.

The rationalistic presumption that historical identity reduces to economic interests — Marxist or neoclassical — too often leads planners to ask citizens to "leave their pain at the door," and this fuels anger, resentment, hostility, suspicion, anything but collaborative, productive planning. Ironically, both post-modernist theories of identity and modernist-instrumental accounts of rationality oversimplify and reduce "identity" in potentially oppressive ways, as Benhabib (1995) makes clear. These concerns lead to issues of "the politics of recognition" involving the "diplomatic recognition" that mediators often confront and that planners have a great deal to learn about (Baum 1997; Forester 1998; Sandercock 1997).

**Mediated Deliberations**

Third, we see increasing attention now to mediated negotiation strategies as ways of managing interdependence. In an account of what planners routinely do in the metropolitan Chicago area, for example, Charles Hoch finds that planners create settings for collaborative public deliberations even in adversarial contexts (Hoch 1994). In this volume, Lawrence Susskind suggests that a central role for planners involves their effective management of public deliberations. In her work on California, New Jersey, and varied cases throughout the country, Judith Innes applies Susskind's seminal work on consensus building and the broader management of public disputes (Innes 1996). In my own work, I've tried to show how public planning efforts often involve precarious processes of public deliberation — precarious because these processes of public learning, always subject to shifting political pressures (Forester 1997, 1999), can be well informed or badly manipulated. These three examples of recent work suggest that planners at all levels face the problems of encouraging participatory planning processes — far beyond the EIS processes Teitz cites — to craft good projects and avoid the traps of both participation and negotiation: the pressures toward exclusion, deal making, and prisoners' dilemma-like lose-lose outcomes, "lousy compromises."

**The Nagging Problem of Inconvenience**

But a planning theory that fits practice too comfortably, an uncritical pragmatism, is not doing its job. Planning theory should help us to improve practice, not just describe yesterday's behavior. "But what does 'improve' mean?" the chorus will sound. "How can we talk about 'improving' practice without
making arguments about "better and worse, good and bad, right and wrong?" This skeptical question, of course, provides its own answer. Planning theory must embrace systematic, reasoned, careful arguments precisely about better and worse planning, good and bad planning, just and unjust planning. How could anyone with feet in the real world respect a body of "theory" that ignored questions of better and worse, good and bad, just and unjust? "But," the skeptic will continue, "how can we have systematic, reasoned, careful discussions of such questions when they are so subjective, so relative to different people's views of the world?" This question, too, contains the seeds of its own answer, for it entangles and confuses two different claims. Yes, worldviews differ and people bring substantially different views of right and wrong, and precisely insofar as we owe each person respect, we owe them enough respect to consider their viewpoints. But we should not confuse, first, respecting a person with, second, agreeing with a viewpoint; this distinction opens up enormous room for research, study, and argument – room we can call moral theory, or ethics or systematic, reasoned, and careful thinking about better and worse, good and bad, just and unjust.

Thus, an inescapable part of serious thinking about planning must involve the analysis of better and worse, just and unjust – if such analysis of planning is to do anything more than describe yesterday's practice. If we wish our best thinking about planning to help improve practice, we will need that thinking to disrupt our complacency about the adequacy of yesterday's ways of doing things.

Recently, a doctoral student in planning on the West Coast noted the relative absence of divisive conflict among planning "theorists" and asked several senior colleagues who seemed to be arguing, "So, what's the problem?" The problem, simply, is complacency: a planning theory that seems to fit contemporary practice too easily, too snugly, and thus in too Panglossian a way. Can anyone begin to argue that contemporary planning practices reflect the best of all possible worlds, the best ways we can imagine to deal with widespread public distrust, with bureaucratic inefficiencies, with problems of exclusion, racism, and the marginality of weaker populations?

So one challenge faced by those in the planning academy is to nurture something more than complacent bureaucrats. To do that, we have to change the field, bring the bad news about how much more remains to be done, speak articulately to the realities of poverty and suffering, deal with race, displacement, and histories of underserved communities in ways that do not leave people's pain at the door (Krumholz and Clavel 1994).

In turn, this means building on Donald Schöen’s influential work to develop not only pragmatically reflective planners but historically and politically reflective planners, so that, in the pragmatism of their recognition of loss and in the pragmatism of their anticipation of politically staged argument, they are able to work critically and deliberatively, mobilizing action to meet pressing public need rather than just, facilitating deal making between those already well organized. To adapt Joe Hill's words, we need to mourn and organize. Recognizing the history of displacement, distrust, and loss that planners in practice often face, we have to educate and encourage not therapists, but critical, politically astute pragmatists, planners able to work in the face of well-taken suspicion, all-too-real histories of loss, and no shortage of anger (see Marris 1975; Susskind and Field 1996).

Educating such planners will require that students and studies of planning encourage us to be more ambitious, to reach higher, to be ever vigilant about the political constraints we so easily accept as "realistic." That will mean, more colloquially, that we want planning theory less to congratulate us about yesterday's achievements and more to rock the boat, not just intellectually, "academically" in the protected ivory tower, but
practically as well, looking at the problems of the day and our strategies for responding to them in ever more insightful, better ways. Hate it as we may, we need planning theory – to speak to practice situations, to learn from practice, and to encourage excellence in practice. Facing ever greater needs to deal with social differences, public and private interdependencies, and citizens’ and decision makers’ needs for good information, planners themselves need critically sensitive, practically pitched planning theory to enrich their practical imaginations more, not less, than ever before.

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